

DOUGLAS J. MOO

ISRAEL AND PAUL IN ROMANS 7.7-12

The close relationship between sin and the law, a recurring theme in Romans 1-4 (3. 19; 4. 15; 5. 20), is given clearest expression in 7. 1-6. In language reminiscent of the discussion of sin in chap. 6, the law is pictured as a power from whose lordship believers find release in Christ (vv. 4, 6) and as an instrument in the arousing of sinful passions which lead to death (v. 5). No wonder that Paul feels it necessary to defend the law from the charge that it is sin (v. 7; cf. v. 12), offering an explanation of the relationship between sin and the law which exonerates the latter (vv. 8-11).¹ This explanation takes the form of a narrative in which sin is cast in the role of the active culprit, while the law is pictured as a passive instrument, used by sin as a 'bridgehead' (*ἀφορμή* - vv. 8, 11) to deceive and bring death.

While the general intent of 7. 7-12 is therefore clear, it is not at all clear whose experience it is which is presented in this narrative. Paul's use for this purpose of the first person singular has stimulated endless discussion, most of it focused on the dogmatically-significant verses following 7. 7-12. With respect to 7. 7-12, however, four general approaches can be distinguished:

1) *ἐγώ* refers to Paul himself, who describes his own experience with the law as exemplary;

2) *ἐγώ* refers to Adam, or to mankind in Adam, the Genesis narrative being viewed as paradigmatic;

3) *ἐγώ* refers to Israel in its encounter with the law at Sinai; and

4) *ἐγώ* refers to man in general or to the Jewish people in general, the narrative style being treated as an idealized picture of human experience.

Views 2, 3 and 4 all assume that *ἐγώ* is a rhetorical figure of speech, an assumption which has been widely held since Kümmel's monograph. Many have followed him also in maintaining a general application of the figure, as in view four, but it is becoming increasingly popular among adherents of this view, in contrast to Kümmel, to admit some allusion to Adam also.² Fewer, although a significant number, have espoused the Adamic view,³ while the interpretation which applies Paul's language to the history of Israel (view three) has been defended only sporadically.⁴ On the other hand, there has been, and continues to be, a significant number of scholars who deny any rhetorical significance to *ἐγώ* and who therefore defend an autobiographical interpretation.⁵

Despite the relative unpopularity of the view - and the ease with which

it is often dismissed⁶ – it is the purpose of this paper to suggest that Rom 7. 7-12 has as its main focus the giving of the law to Israel. To accomplish this, it will be argued: 1) that the focus of the text, *νόμος*, should probably be understood as a reference to the *Mosaic* law; and 2) that the narrative sequence of the text reflects a Pauline theological pattern having to do with the redemptive-historical experience of Israel with the law. In addition, however, I will argue that the first person style strongly implies some degree of autobiographical reference also.

I. ΝΟΜΟΣ IN ROM 7. 7-12

That the Mosaic law is under discussion in 7. 7-12 is strongly suggested, first, by the commandment which Paul quotes in v. 7: *οὐκ ἐπιθυμήσεις* ('you shall not covet'). To be sure, *ἐπιθυμία*, with the general sense of 'illicit desire', was sometimes singled out as the root sin (Philo, *Spec. Leg.* 4. 84-94; Jas. 1. 15) and Paul himself uses the word and its cognate verb in a general sense (see, e.g. 1 Cor 10. 6). But the negative formulation here, reproduced exactly in Rom 13. 9 with unmistakable reference to the decalogue, points to the tenth commandment specifically.⁷ However, the omission of objects after the verb suggests that Paul, like Philo (*Decal.* 142-153, 173) and the author of 4 Maccabees (2. 6) before him, uses the tenth commandment as a representative summation of the Mosaic law.⁸ It is this commandment in its generic significance, then, to which *ἐντολή* in vv. 8-11 refers, not to any specific commandment as such.⁹

A second reason for thinking that the *Mosaic* law is the focus in Rom 7. 7-12 arises from a consideration of Paul's use of *νόμος*. Although he uses the term in more than one way,¹⁰ it is clear that *νόμος*, in the vast majority of occurrences, designates the Mosaic law. And, in *this sense*, *νόμος* is Israel's peculiar possession. This is shown by the designation of Gentiles as *τὰ μὴ νόμον ἔχοντα* (Rom 2. 14; cf. 2. 12 [*ἀνόμως*] and 1 Cor 9. 20-21) and of Jews as the possessors of *ἡ νομοθεσία* (Rom 9. 4; cf. 3. 2 [*τὰ λόγια τοῦ θεοῦ*]); by the fact that the law hinders the full incorporation of Jews and Gentiles into one people of God (Eph 2. 14-15; implicitly in Rom 3. 27-31); and, more tangentially by the concentration of references to the law in letters dealing with the Jewish-Gentile controversy. Only Romans 2, with its references to Gentiles who become 'a law to themselves' (v. 14), who 'show forth the work of the law written on the heart' (v. 15) and who do the law (vv. 26, 27), appears to contradict this limitation of the law to Israel.¹¹ However, in interpreting these references, we must keep in mind that in this same passage Paul has explicitly denied that the Gentiles possess the law. With this in mind, it can plausibly be argued that Paul speaks of the Gentiles' confrontation with *νόμος* as a means of placing them in an analogous situation to Israel and thereby,

by highlighting Gentile fulfilment of the law, to indict self-complacent Judaism.¹² It is not necessary to understand Paul as according to Gentiles possession of the specifically *Mosaic* torah. But whatever our interpretation, these verses clearly represent an exceptional use of νόμος.¹³ Paul's clear tendency to view νόμος as a special gift to Israel stands against any 'universalistic' interpretation of Rom 7. 7–12.¹⁴

If Paul generally confines the purview of νόμος to Jews, he also limits its duration in accordance with his redemptive-history perspective. While not as obvious in Romans 4 as in the parallel text in Galatians 3, the idea of the law as an entity with a specific purpose and with clear temporal limits is nevertheless clearly found in Romans. Rom 5. 13–14 characterizes the period from Adam to Moses as being 'without law', while 5. 20 portrays the law as an 'intruder' in salvation-history, 'coming in' between Adam and Christ.¹⁵ The discussion of the law in Romans 7 is organically linked to these references (particularly 5. 20) via 6. 14 ('for you are not under law but under grace').¹⁶ And the presentation of the law in 7. 1–6 as an imprisoning, sin-arousing power characterized by 'oldness of letter' in contrast to 'newness of Spirit'¹⁷ – with its many obvious similarities to passages such as Galatians 2–3 and 2 Corinthians 3¹⁸ – indicates that Paul is still thinking, as in Romans 5, of the Mosaic law in its limited redemptive-historical function. But for Paul's argument to make sense, the law defended in vv. 7–12 must be identical with the law portrayed so negatively in 5. 20, 6. 14 and 7. 1–6.

If the limitation of the law to Israel creates a difficulty for the universal application of Rom 7. 7–12, Paul's temporal delimitation of the law constitutes a serious objection to the Adamic view. How could Paul feature Adam's experience in a discussion about a law which he presents as entering the historical arena only with *Moses*? Proponents of the Adamic view customarily answer this question by suggesting that Paul assumes the view, attested in a number of Jewish sources, to the effect that Adam was given and made responsible for the *torah* in the garden.¹⁹ But not only is there no evidence for this view in Paul, it is most unlikely that he would have made any such assumption. The temporal limitation of the *torah* is a key element in Paul's theology, a linchpin in his conception of redemptive history and a critical point in his polemic with Judaism. It is far too basic and significant a belief for Paul to have contradicted it without explanation in one of his most important discussions of the law.²⁰ That Paul viewed Adam as, in some sense, a 'prototype' of man under the law is suggested by Rom 5. 14,²¹ but the similarity consists in the situation of confrontation with the divine demand; nothing indicates that the analogy must be extended to include possession of the same *body* of demands.²²

It seems best, then, to restrict the signification of νόμος/ἐντολή in Rom 7. 7–12 to that body of divine revelation which had its origin with Moses

and found its τέλος in Christ (Rom 10. 4). Such a restriction effectively rules out the (purely) Adamic view as well as the interpretation which applies Paul's discussion to humankind generally. A consideration of the narrative sequence will serve to narrow further the possibilities.

II. THE NARRATIVE SEQUENCE

The chiastically-arranged narrative²³ of vv. 8b-10a, in which sin moves from death to life while 'έγω' moves from life to death, presents a crucial interpretive problem. It is its ability to explain this sequence which comprises the great attraction of the Adamic interpretation. 'Life' and 'death' can be accorded their full theological meanings, referring, respectively, to Adam's state before and after his disastrous confrontation with the divine commandment, and the springing to life of the previously inactive sin can be regarded as a fitting description of the role of the serpent in the garden.²⁴ However, we have seen that, whatever its virtues, the Adamic view cannot satisfactorily be reconciled with the central concern of the text – the Mosaic *torah*.²⁵ How, then, do other views fare in explaining this sequence?

Proponents of the autobiographical view understand the transition of the έγω from life to death as a description of one of three experiences in the life of Paul: 1) his childhood awakening to consciousness of guilt;²⁶ 2) his realization, perhaps as a preliminary to his conversion, of the real meaning of the law and his own condemnation under it;²⁷ 3) his inability to conquer the power of sin.²⁸ None of these alternatives gives the verb ζάω in the phrase έξων χωρις νόμου ποτέ (v. 9a) its full theological force, but this is not so great a problem as is sometimes asserted. Paul uses ζάω of spiritual life rather infrequently and the only other occurrence of the verb in the imperfect in the Pauline corpus (Col 3. 7), for what it is worth, refers to simple existence.²⁹ On the other hand, it is difficult to understand by άπέθανον (v. 10a) anything other than condemnation resulting from sin, what E. Best has recently called 'realized eschatological death'.³⁰ Clearly it is death in this sense which Paul highlights as the end result of 'sinful passions' in 7. 5 and which is explicitly denied to be the fault of the law in 7. 13. But since the argument in which vv. 8b-10a are imbedded focuses on death as eschatological penalty, the logic of Paul's argument requires that this be the meaning of άπέθανον in v. 10 also. However, this meaning may be retained in the autobiographical view if Paul is regarded as looking back on his Jewish experience and, from his Christian insight, characterizing his relationship with the law as resulting in death.

However, another problem for the autobiographical interpretation is the sequence χωρις νόμου – έλθούσης δέ τής έντολής. If this language is to

be applied to Paul's life, it must be taken subjectively, as the description of a sudden, deepened understanding of the law³¹ or of the undertaking of a new responsibility for the law – perhaps at his transition to adulthood.³² Neither explanation is without problems. The former suggests a struggle with the law which appears to be inconsistent with Paul's characterization of his experience under the law in Philippians 3. Nor do any of the New Testament accounts of Paul's conversion suggest such a struggle.³³ The latter view, on the other hand, assumes a more significant transition from childhood 'innocence' to mature awareness of and responsibility for the law than the available sources indicate.³⁴ And both alternatives apply Paul's ostensibly objective, descriptive language to the realm of the subjective consciousness. Not only is there no obvious reason for doing this, but the interpretation of vv. 8b–10a in terms of personal *awareness* also implies a view of the law at variance with the context. That is, when the 'coming of the commandment' is referred to Paul's real understanding of the law and his death as his realization of guilt, the role of the law is that of *revealer*. But while some reference to this revelatory function of the law may be present in v. 7,³⁵ the focus in the immediate context of vv. 8b–10a is on the law as a stimulant of sin and instrument of death.

Therefore, while the autobiographical interpretation of the narrative is not impossible, the need to interpret the language in terms of Paul's consciousness renders the view improbable. It is necessary to seek more satisfactory explanations of this sequence.

The rhetorical view has little to offer at this point. The interpretation itself is usually established *via negationis*: no single set of circumstances, it is argued, can satisfactorily account for all the details of the text, so a generalized situation is posited, according to which any real historical sequence is denied.³⁶ Now the denial of historical sequence may be necessary if, indeed, no single situation, or plausible combination of situations, can be discerned in the text without doing violence to it. But the passage certainly *appears* to depict a historical sequence, with the consistent use of the past tense (contrast 7. 14–25). And we would contend that a reading of 7. 8–10 against the background of some other Pauline texts makes it possible to isolate such a situation.

In Rom 4. 13–16, Paul denies the efficacy of the law as a means of securing the promise with its inheritance. Dependence on the law (*ἐκ νόμου* – v. 14) effectually nullifies the promise because (v. 15a) the law produces wrath. The following clause (v. 15b) appears to supply the reason why the law has this effect – transgression comes with the law.³⁷ Crucial for understanding this text is the recognition that Paul carefully distinguishes *παράβασις* and *ἁμαρτία*, using *παράβασις* only of the failure to meet a specific expressed requirement.³⁸ In Rom 4. 15, then, the point is that the law, far from enabling one to establish a claim upon God, drives

one deeper into despair by making him individually responsible for a specific set of commandments.

Probably Rom 5. 20a should be understood in a similar manner: the law increased 'the trespass' (note the singular *παράπτωμα* and the link created thereby with Adam [vv. 15, 17, 18]) because it set a standard by which wrongdoing could be revealed as rebellion against God.³⁹ This understanding of the law is found elsewhere in Paul (Gal 3. 19; 2 Cor 3. 6-7; 1 Cor 15. 56), and comes to expression in a roundabout way in Rom 5. 13-14. These verses, which are apparently intended to substantiate or explain something in v. 12 (*γάρ*), focus on the period between Adam and Moses, when 'there was no law'.⁴⁰ During this time, Paul asserts, 'death reigned, even over those who did not sin in the likeness (*ὁμιώμα*) of Adam's transgression (*παράβασις*)'. Significantly, Paul appears to regard this reign of death as somehow anomalous (*ἀλλά* - v. 14) because the law with its sin - 'reckoning' effect did not yet exist (v. 13b).⁴¹ It is difficult to determine precisely what 'reckon' (*ἐλλογεῖται*) in v. 13 signifies, but the express mention of *παράβασις* in v. 14 suggests that Paul is thinking of the *deepened* personal responsibility for sin which comes with an express revelation of the divine requirement.⁴²

Returning now to the narrative sequence of Rom 7. 8b-10a, it should be evident that this text fits very nicely into the theological pattern we have isolated, particularly as it is found in Rom 5. 13-14.⁴³ The 'coming to life [again⁴⁴]' of the previously inert sin (v. 8b) is a vivid portrayal of what Paul describes more prosaically in 1 Cor 15. 56b: 'the power of sin is the law'. And the 'death' of the *ἐγώ* at the coming of the commandment corresponds closely with Paul's understanding of the Mosaic law as an instrument which imprisons under sin (Rom 7. 6; Gal 3. 22, 23), enables wrongdoing to be 'charged' to each individual's account as trespass (Rom 5. 13, cf. Gal 3. 19) producing wrath (Rom 4. 15) and death (2 Cor 3. 7). Even the 'life' of the *ἐγώ* before the coming of the commandment (v. 8b) can be compared with Paul's description of the situation of people before Sinai whose sins were not 'reckoned' as they were after the possession of the law (Rom 5. 13). These indisputable similarities between the narrative of Rom 7. 8-10 and Paul's theology of the Mosaic law lead to the conclusion that Paul in this passage depicts the effect of the giving of the law on Israel. 'When the commandment came' can then be taken naturally as a reference to the promulgation of the Sinaitic revelation.

Against this interpretation, it is frequently urged that it is illegitimate to give to the terms *ἔζων* and *ἀπέθανον* anything less than their full theological meanings. Certainly Paul viewed all men, Jews and Gentiles, as standing under God's condemnation *before* the giving of the law (cf. Rom 5. 13-14), and we have seen that 'death' in Rom 7. 5-13 clearly involves eschatological penalty. But while *ἀπέθανον* cannot designate the initial

sentence of death imposed upon *individual* Israelites, it can be suggested that Paul views the law as that instrument which brought the sentence of death to Israel as a *collective body*, formed definitively in and through the Sinai experience.⁴⁵ Paul's references to the law elsewhere as 'the power of sin' (1 Cor 15. 56b), an instrument of wrath (Rom 4. 15), the letter that kills, a 'ministry of death' (2 Cor 3. 6, 7) and the criterion of Israel's judgment (Rom 2. 12), demonstrate that Paul did indeed view the law in this way. On the other hand, there is no reason why ἐξῶν need have any theological force at all – Paul rarely uses the verb with this meaning; as we have seen, he never elsewhere uses life/death *in that order* in a theological contrast, and 'life' plays no role in the discussion of Romans 7.⁴⁶

A further consideration which may help explain the strength of Paul's language is the polemical context of his argument. For Jews, the giving of the law was viewed as providing Israel an opportunity to secure life,⁴⁷ indeed, although probably not typical, at least one tradition claims that original sin was taken away from Israel at Sinai.⁴⁸ While agreeing with Judaism that the law had a positive life-securing purpose (εἰς ζώην – v. 10), Paul emphatically denies that this had been its effect. Rather than preventing sin,⁴⁹ the law had stimulated sin (cf. 5. 20, 7. 5),⁵⁰ and 'imprisoned' Israel in that sin (Gal 3. 22, 23; cf. Rom 7. 6). Thus, with this background in mind, and with some hyperbole, Paul argues essentially that the giving of the law meant for Israel not life, but death.

Thus, while it can be argued that the Adamic view offers a more natural explanation of ἐξῶν and ἀπέθανον, we have seen that these terms can also be appropriately applied to the situation of Israel. However, the fact that the text can, to some extent, be applied to either Adam or Israel does demonstrate, as we suggested above, that Paul sees a basic similarity in the situations of Adam confronted by the Paradise command and Israel confronted by the law.⁵¹ But, we would maintain, Paul is speaking in this text of the latter, as the focus on the Mosaic law demonstrates. Linguistic⁵² and conceptual parallels with the Paradise narrative are due to the intrinsic similarities of the two situations.

III. WHY ΕΓΩ?

If, as we have argued, Rom 7. 7–12 portrays the experience of Israel at Sinai, it will be necessary to understand ἐγώ as a rhetorical device. That ἐγώ can have a rhetorical significance was demonstrated by Kümmel. And, further, it is clear that ἐγώ, when used rhetorically, need not include reference to the speaker or author. But, against Kümmel, it must be questioned whether it is legitimate to remove *all* autobiographical force from the pronoun when it occurs in a context like Romans 7. Of the examples of rhetorical ἐγώ which Kümmel cites, seven occur in an explicitly hypothetical

construction,⁵³ six in a deliberative style⁵⁴ and one (probably) in a quotation.⁵⁵ The inherently 'unreal' nature of these constructions is so different from the narrative and confessional style of Romans 7 that it is hardly fair to compare them. On the other hand, none of the four narrative passages mentioned by Kümmel clearly excludes the author.⁵⁶ Since Kümmel's monograph, appeal to several passages in the Dead Sea Scrolls has been made in order to buttress the 'purely' rhetorical view (1QS 11. 9-10; 1QH 1. 21-23; 3. 24-26).⁵⁷ But here, too, the first person singular construction, while generalizing, almost certainly includes the writer.⁵⁸ Nor do there appear to be any occurrences of the first person singular in a narrative construction in Paul which exclude the apostle.

In light of this, it would seem probable that some reference to Paul himself must be included in any acceptable interpretation of Romans 7.⁵⁹ This is not, however, to go back to the autobiographical interpretation and jettison the view of the text which we have argued above. It suggests, rather, that in Romans 7 *ἐγώ* has been used because Paul identifies himself, in a 'corporate' sense, with the experiences of his own people. Galatians 2. 18-21, another Pauline *ἐγώ* text, may involve a similar 'corporate' relationship between Paul and Israel.⁶⁰ Furthermore, it is possible that a plausible background (source?) for this use of the first person singular can be identified. The closest parallel to the style of Romans 7, as Luz suggests, is the use of the first person singular in passages such as Jer 10. 19-22 and Mic 7. 7-10, Lam 1. 9-22; 2. 20-22 and Pss Sol 1. 1-2. 6 to represent Jerusalem or Israel.⁶¹ Clearly the 'I' in these passages is a rhetorical device, employed to narrate with intense subjective language the horrors which have befallen the city and the people. At the same time, however, elements of personal identification on the part of the writer with the situation are always close at hand.

In vv. 7-12, then, it seems best to conclude that Paul describes the experience of Israel at Sinai but uses the first person because he himself, as a Jew, has been affected by that experience. In vv. 14-25, where the subsequent struggle of Israel under the law is depicted, Paul writes with more subjectivity because the struggle is one that he has to some extent personally experienced. Its ability to explain the perplexing combination of objective narrative and subjective confession in Romans 7 is a further strength of the view which has been presented.⁶²

IV. CONCLUSION

We therefore conclude that Rom 7. 7-12 employs a vivid narrative style in order to give a theological interpretation of Israel's encounter with the law at Sinai. This interpretation is superior to the Adamic view because it takes naturally Paul's focus on the Mosaic law and fits better with Paul's

salvation-historical scheme.⁶³ On the other hand, this 'redemptive-historical' view is to be preferred over both the autobiographical and rhetorical approaches because it retains more of the objective, historical force of Paul's language. And, finally, the focus on Israel presumed in this view is in keeping with the increasingly recognized need to put the Jewish question at the heart rather than the periphery of Romans.

NOTES

[1] Thus 7. 7-12, while offering what may be termed an 'apology for the law', also affirms and explains the fact that the law has become sin's ally (See R. Schnackenburg, 'Römer 7 in Zusammenhang des Römerbriefes', *Jesus und Paulus: Festschrift für Werner Georg Kümmel zum 70. Geburtstag* [ed. E. E. Ellis and E. Grasser; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1975] 292). In light of this, it is preferable to take ἀλλά in v. 7 as restrictive ('No, but it is true that . . .') rather than as adversative ('No, on the contrary . . .') (W. G. Kümmel, *Römer 7 und das Bild des Menschen im Neuen Testament: Zwei Studien* [TBü 53; Munich: Kaiser, 1974] 47; *contra*, e.g. C. E. B. Cranfield, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans* [ICC n.s.; 2 vols.; Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1975, 1979], 1.347-8).

[2] See, for instance: G. Bornkamm, 'Sin, Law and Death: An Exegetical Study of Romans 7', *Early Christian Experience* (London: SCM, 1969) 87-104; E. Käsemann, *Romans* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1980) 192-7; H. Hübner, *Das Gesetz bei Paulus. Ein Beitrag zum Werden der paulinischen Theologie* (FRLANT 119; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1978) 66-9; P. Démann, 'Moïse et la Loi dans la Pensée de Saint Paul', *Moïse: L'homme de L'Alliance* (Cahiers Sionens; Tournai: Desclée, 1955) 204-5; W. Schmithals, *Die theologische Anthropologie des Paulus: Auslegung von Röm 7,17-8,39* (Kohlhammer Taschenbücher 1021; Stuttgart/Berlin/Cologne/Mainz: Kohlhammer, 1980) 26-7.

[3] See particularly: S. Lyonnet, 'L'histoire du salut selon le chapitre vii de l'Épître aux Romains', *Bib* 43 (1962) 117-51; *idem*, "'Tu ne convoiteras pas" (Rom. 7.7)', *Neotestamentica et Patristica: Eine Freundesgabe, Herrn Professor Dr. Oscar Cullmann zu seinem 60. Geburtstag überreicht* (NovT Sup 6; Leiden: Brill, 1962) 158-64; R. N. Longenecker, *Paul: Apostle of Liberty* (New York: Harper & Row, 1964) 88-95.

[4] Chrysostom stands virtually alone as an advocate of this view in the early church (Homily XII on Romans). Some recent proponents are: E. Stauffer, 'Ἐγὼ', *TDNT* 2 (1964) 358-62; A. van Dülmen, *Die Theologie des Gesetzes im Paulus* (SBM 5; Stuttgart: Katholischer Bibelwerk, 1968) 101-2, 109-10; J. Lambrecht, 'Man before and without Christ: Romans 7 and Pauline Anthropology', *Louvain Studies* 5 (1974) 18-33; Gottlob Schrenk, 'Ἐντολή', *TDNT* 2 (1964) 550-1; N. T. Wright, 'The Messiah and the People of God: A Study in Pauline Theology with particular Reference to the Argument of the Epistle to the Romans', Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, U. of Oxford (1980) 145-6; and, less clearly: H. Ridderbos, *Aan de Romeinen* (Commentaar op het Nieuwe Testament; Kampen: Kok, 1959) 148; P. Benoit, 'La Loi et la Croix d'après saint Paul (Rom. 7:7-8:4)', *RB* 47 (1938) 483-7; O. Michel, *Der Brief an die Römer* (Meyer K.; 5th ed.; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1978) 242.

[5] See especially A. J. Bandstra, *The Law and the Elements of the World: An Exegetical Study in Aspects of Paul's Teaching* (Kampen: Kok, 1964) 135-6; J. D. G. Dunn, 'Romans 7, 14-25 in the Theology of Paul', *TZ* 31 (1975) 257-73; R. H. Gundry, 'The Moral Frustration of Paul before his Conversion: Sexual Lust in Romans 7:7-25', *Pauline Studies: Essays presented to Professor F. F. Bruce on his 70th Birthday* (ed. D. A. Hagner and M. J. Harris; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1980) 228-45.

[6] See, for instance, Kuss' excursus on the history of the interpretation of Rom 7. 7-25 (*Der Römerbrief* [3 vols.: Regensburg: Friedrich Pustet, 1957-78], 2. 467); Bornkamm, 'Sin, Law and Death', 93.

[7] Schrenk, 'Ἐντολή', 550; Gundry, 'Moral Frustration', 230; D. H. Campbell, 'The Identity of ἐγὼ in Romans 7. 7-25', *Studia Biblica 1978*. III: Papers on Paul and Other New Testament Authors (ed. E. A. Livingstone; *JSNT* Sup 3; Sheffield: *JSOT*, 1980) 61. Lyonnet ("Tu ne convoiteras pas") has presented the strongest case for an alternative - the Paradise commandment. He notes

that 'desire' without object is found in *Tg. Neof.* Exod. 10. 17, that *Tg. Neof.* likewise uses the root *hmd* (whose Heb. equivalent is sometimes translated with *ἐπιθυμέω* in LXX) in Gen 3. 6, and that *b. Sabb.* 145b-146a says that 'desire' was injected in Eve by the serpent. But the first reference proves no more than that, as argued above, there was a tendency in some circles to absolutize 'coveting', while the other two are tangential to the issue. In fact, Lyonnet furnishes no evidence that Jews ever interpreted the Paradise commandment as a prohibition of 'coveting'. It should also be noted that *ἐπιθυμέω* and its cognates do not occur in Genesis 1-3, but are used in Ps 100 (106) 14 with reference to the wilderness generation (cf. J. G. Strelan, 'A Note on the Old Testament Background of Romans 7:7', *Luth Theo Jour* 15 (1981) 23-5).

[8] See also *Pesiq. R.* 21 (107a) (fourth century) (H. J. Schoeps, *Paul: The Theology of the Apostle in the Light of Jewish Religious History* [Philadelphia: Westminster, 1959] 191).

[9] Kümmel, *Römer* 7, 56. Gundry ('Moral Frustration', 232) argues that the commandment has specific reference to sexual lust here but, although 4 Macc 2. 6 occurs in a context having to do with sex, Paul's own usage and the context give no support to this restriction.

[10] In Romans, *νόμος* is used of the Pentateuch (Rom 3. 21), of the OT as a whole (3. 19), possibly of secular law (7. 1-3 [so W. Sanday and A. C. Headlam, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans* (ICC; Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1902) 172; but cf. Kümmel, *Römer* 7, 38]), and with the more general sense of 'force' or 'principle' (3. 27 *bis* [probably; though see G. Friedrich, 'Das Gesetz des Glaubens. Röm. 3, 27', *TZ* 10 (1954) 401-17], 7. 21; 7. 23 [probably in the first and third occurrences], 7. 25b; 8. 2 [probably in the first occurrence; possibly in the second], 9. 31 *bis* [possibly]).

The attempt to discern different meanings of *νόμος* by means of the presence or absence of the article (many older commentators; cf. e.g. Sanday-Headlam) has now been generally (and properly) abandoned (see the early discussion in Edward Grafe, *Die paulinische Lehre vom Gesetz nach den vier Hauptbriefen* [Freiburg and Tübingen: Mohr, 1884] 5-8).

[11] The view of Barth (*A Shorter Commentary on Romans* [Richmond, Va.: John Knox, 1959] 36; cf. also Cranfield, *Romans*, 1. 156) that Gentile-Christians are intended in these verses would remove this inconsistency, but the position has many difficulties.

[12] Käsemann, *Romans*, 62-4.

[13] A. Feuillet ('Loi de Dieu, loi du Christ et loi de l'esprit d'après les Epîtres pauliniennes: Les Rapports de ces trois lois avec la Loi Mosaique', *NovT* 22 (1980) 29-65) has recently argued for a broad reference of *νόμος* in 7. 25 and 8. 7. I cannot follow him on 7. 25; on 8. 7, something can be said for a universal condemnatory function of the law (cf. 2. 14-16).

[14] Stauffer, 'Εγώ', 358; Schrenk, 'Ἐντολή', 550-1; Karl Prümm, 'Rom 1-11 und 2 Kor 3', *Bib* 31 (1950) 177-80. *Contra*, e.g. C. K. Barrett, who says of Rom 7, 'It is in the last analysis the meaning of religion that is analyzed here' (*A Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans* [HNTC; New York: Harper & Row, 1957] 140).

[15] While the verb *παρεισέρχομαι* need not indicate a hostile action (Cranfield, *Romans* 1. 292; Käsemann, *Romans*, 158), it does clearly characterize the law as a temporary and essentially negative element in the *Heilsgeschichte* (Käsemann). As R. Scroggs says, 'The Apostle thus dethrones Moses from his position of life-giver *via* salvation through Torah' (*The Last Adam: A Study in Paul's Theology* [Philadelphia: Fortress, 1966] 2).

[16] Schnackenburg ('Römer 7', 291) points to this connection as well as to a number of parallels between 7. 1-6 and 6. 15-23.

[17] The antithesis between *πνεῦμα* and *γράμμα* should not be understood with reference to how the law is understood (Cranfield, *Romans*, 1. 339-40), but with reference to the salvation-historical disjunction of the 'two ages' (E. Käsemann, 'The Spirit and the Letter', *Perspectives on Paul* [London: SCM, 1971] 143-7; B. Schneider, 'The Meaning of St. Paul's Antithesis "The Letter and the Spirit"', *CBQ* 15 [1953] 203-6).

[18] In 7. 6, the phrase *ἀποθανόντες [ἐκενώ] ἐν ᾧ κατερχόμεθα* is reminiscent of Gal 3. 22-25 (this parallel as well as the grammar shows that *νόμος*, not *σάρξ*, should be understood as the antecedent of ᾧ [Kümmel, *Römer* 7, 42; Cranfield, *Romans*, 1. 338-9; Käsemann, *Romans*, 189-90; *contra* Sanday-Headlam, *Romans*, 175]). Schneider ('"Letter and Spirit"', 203) lists several striking parallels between 2 Cor 3. 7-18 and Rom 7. 1-6.

[19] Lyonnet, "'Tu ne convoiteras pas"', 159-63; Longenecker, *Paul*, 94-5. On the tradition, see G. F. Moore, *Judaism in the First Centuries of the Christian Era: The Age of the Tannaim* (2 vols.; New York: Schocken, 1927, 1930), 1. 274.

[20] André Feuillet, 'Le plan salvifique de Dieu d'après l'Épître aux Romains', *RB* 57 (1950) 368-9; Benoit, 'La Loi', 483. Kümmel (*Römer* 7, 87) correctly observes: '... das Erleben Adams und der in ihm beschlossenen Menschheit konnte auch niemals zum Beweise dafür dienen, daß das mosaische Gesetz nicht Sünde, sondern nur eine Handhabe für die Sünde war.'

[21] The statement that men living between Adam and Moses 'did not sin in the likeness [ὁμοιωματι] of Adam's transgression' implies a parallel between Adam and those who were subject to the Mosaic law.

[22] Against Longenecker (*Paul*, 94-5) who, sensitive to the difficulty of finding a pre-mosaic νόμος in Paul, seeks to salvage the Adamic view by suggesting that Adam possessed according to Paul a prototype of the *torah*.

[23] See Kümmel, *Römer* 7, 51.

[24] S. Lyonnet, *Les étapes de l'histoire du salut selon l'Épître aux Romains* (Bibliothèque Oecuménique 8; Paris: Cerf, 1969) 139-60. Similarly, Käsemann asserts: 'There is nothing in the passage which does not fit Adam, and everything fits Adam alone' (*Romans*, 196).

[25] Other, less difficult, problems confront the Adamic view: 1) the interval of time during which ἐγὼ is without the law is difficult to fit into the Paradise narrative; 2) the contrast 'sin was dead' (v. 8b)/'sin sprang to life' (v. 9b) suggests that sin existed as a force in the world (not just in the serpent) before the commandment came; 3) Adam is, of course, not named (for these criticisms and others, see: Gundry, 'Moral Frustration', 230-1; Benoit, 'La Loi', 493; Bornkamm, 'Sin, Law and Death', 93).

[26] A. Deissmann, *Paul: A Study in Social and Religious History* (2nd ed.; New York: Harper & Bros., 1927) 91; Sanday-Headlam, *Romans*, 180; W. D. Davies, *Paul and Rabbinic Judaism: Some Rabbinic Elements in Pauline Theology* (Rev. ed.; New York: Harper & Row, 1948) 24-5.

[27] J. Calvin, *Commentaries on the Epistle of Paul the Apostle to the Romans* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1947) 255; C. Hodge, *Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1886) 224; J. Murray, *The Epistle to the Romans* (2 vols.; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1959, 1965), 1.251; Bandstra, *Law*, 137.

[28] C. H. Dodd, *The Epistle of Paul to the Romans* (MNTC; New York: Harper & Row, 1932) 110-111; Gundry, 'Moral Frustration', 232.

[29] Of the 59 occurrences of ἄω in the Pauline corpus, only nine refer probably to spiritual life (Rom 1. 17; 6. 13; 8. 13; 10. 5; 2 Cor 8. 4(?); Gal 2. 19; 3. 11; 3. 12; 5. 25) (See on this Bandstra, *Law*, 137 and the survey of usage in Kuss, *Römerbrief*, 2.445-6). Dunn's attempt to bolster the autobiographical interpretation by appealing to Paul's death/life language ('Romans 7', 261) fails because only here does Paul speak of a transition from life to death.

[30] 'Dead in Trespasses and Sins (Eph. 2.1)', *JSNT* 13 (1981) 16.

[31] Calvin, *Romans*, 255; Hodge, *Romans*, 224; Murray, *Romans*, 1.251; Bandstra, *Law*, 137.

[32] Although the *bar mitzvah* as such is a medieval development (S. Safrai, 'Home and Family', *The Jewish People in the First Century* [ed. S. Safrai and M. Stern; 2 vols.; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1974, 1976] 2.771, it is argued that evidence exists in earlier sources for some sort of legal shift at age 13 (Gundry, 'Moral Frustration', 232).

[33] Cf. the classic essay of K. Stendahl, 'The Apostle Paul and the Introspective Conscience of the West', *HTR* 56 (1963) 199-215 (reprinted in *Paul Among Jews and Gentiles and Other Essays* [Philadelphia: Fortress, 1976] 78-96).

[34] In one place (*Rer. Div. Her.* 293-9), Philo speaks of a child's first seven years as being without good and evil, but he elsewhere (*Leg. Gai.* 210) indicates that the Jewish child learned the law at an early age. The rabbis testify to some increase in responsibility for the law as a child grows (cf. *m. 'Abot* 5. 21), but the same texts also indicate that children were taught the law from a very early age (See on this point Kümmel, *Römer* 7, 81-3 and Longenecker, *Paul*, 91-2). However, Gundry is correct in pointing out that the autobiographical view demands nothing more than an increased sensitivity to the law; the degree to which the law was taught to the child is strictly immaterial ('Moral Frustration', 233). In this case, the difficulty is in understanding ἐξῶν χωρὶς νόμου ποτέ as a reference to this sensitivity to the law.

[35] It is debated whether v. 7 introduces this idea of the revelatory function of the law, the meanings to be assigned οἶδα and γινώσκω being the crucial issue. These verbs have been taken in two general senses: 1) experientially - involvement in sinning itself (Kümmel, *Römer* 7, 45; R. Bultmann, *Theology of the New Testament* [2 vols.; New York: Scribner's, 1951, 1955], 1.265; Bornkamm, 'Sin, Law and Death', 102; H. Schlier, *Der Römerbrief* [HTKNT; 2nd ed.; Freiburg: Herder,

1979] 221); 2) noetically – awareness of sin (H. A. W. Meyer, *Critical and Exegetical Handbook to the Epistle to the Romans* [Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1883] 269; Benoit, 'La Loi', 487). What seems to fit the context best, and do justice to the fact that *oída* only infrequently denotes simple experience, is something of a combination of these two according to which Paul refers to the understanding of sin in all its depths (cf. v. 13), as rebellion against God – 'Herausarbeitung des Wesens der Sünde *coram deo*' (Michel, *Römer*, 227; see also Cranfield, *Romans*, 1. 348–9; H. Ridderbos, *Paul: An Outline of His Theology* [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1975] 151; W. Gutbrod, 'Νόμος', *TDNT* 4 [1967] 1073; D. W. Burdick, 'oída and ginōskō in the Pauline Epistles', *New Dimensions in New Testament Study* [ed. R. N. Longenecker and M. C. Tenney; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1974] 351).

[36] Thus, for instance, Kümmel finds no fixed experience depicted and takes *πoreí* (v. 9) 'ganz allgemein den Lebenszustand' (*Römer* 7, 132–3) – similarly, H. Conzelmann (*An Outline of the Theology of the New Testament* [London: SCM, 1969] 233 argues that Paul 'replaces Adam with himself, the Adamitic man, and thus draws time together into one point.'

[37] So Käsemann, *Romans*, 121.

[38] Cf. Rom 2. 23; 4. 15; 5. 14; Gal 3. 19; 1 Tim 2. 14(?) and J. Schneider, 'Παράβασις', *TDNT* 5 (1967) 739.

[39] Cranfield, *Romans*, 1.292–3. The view according to which the increase of trespass involves the attempt to base one's existence on fulfilment of the law will be discussed at a later point.

[40] The mention of this specific period of time makes it clear that νόμος refers to the Mosaic law in these verses. To interpret Paul as implying the existence of law at all periods (Murray, *Romans*, 1.188–9; F. W. Danker, 'Romans V.12: Sin Under Law', *NTS* 14 [1967–8] 430–1) is to misunderstand the text and Paul's doctrine of the law (see on this point C. K. Barrett, *From First Adam to Last: A Study in Paul's Theology* [New York: Scribner's, 1962] 15, 23–4).

[41] This emphasis could mean that Paul intends vv. 13–14 as support for a 'corporate' interpretation of v. 12: the death of people before the law can be fully explained only by reference to Adam's 'transgression' (Ridderbos, *Paul*, 96; Sanday-Headlam, *Romans*, 135). N. A. Dahl (*Studies in Paul: Theology for the Early Christian Mission* [Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1977] 91) argues from these verses that only from Adam to Moses did people die because of Adam's sin. Against Wedderburn ('The Theological Structure of Romans V.12', *NTS* 19 [1972–3] 352), it is not necessarily sin against the law (Mosaic) which the argument of vv. 13–14 presupposes, but sin against any revealed commandment.

[42] ἐλλογέω, used elsewhere in the NT only in Philemon 18, means to 'charge to someone's account' (BAG; cf. H. Preisker, 'Ἐλλογέω', *TDNT* 2 [1964] 517) and suggests, therefore, the idea of personal responsibility. Clearly, in light of Romans 1–3, Paul cannot mean that men bear no responsibility for their own sins before the law. For variations of the view presented here in this text, see: Preisker, 'Ἐλλογέω', 517; Barrett, *Romans*, 112; Cranfield, *Romans*, 1.282; E. Jüngel, 'Das Gesetz zwischen Adam und Christus: Eine theologische Studie zu Röm. 5, 12–21', *ZTK* 60 (1963) 54; G. Friedrich, 'Ἀμαρτία οὐκ ἐλλογεῖται Röm. 5, 13', *TLZ* 77 (1952) cols. 523–8; W. Grundmann, 'Ἀμαρτάνω', *TDNT* 1 (1964) 310; J. Cambier, *L'Evangile de Dieu selon l'Épître aux Romains*; Vol. 1: *L'Evangile de la Justice et de la grâce* (Stud Neot 3; Brussels and Louvain: Desclée, 1967) 250–5. Schoeps cites a possible rabbinic parallel (*Pesiq. R.* 107a); 'Had I not received the law, I would have been as one of the heathen nations, for whom there is neither recompense nor punishment' (*Paul*, 191).

[43] Several scholars point to 5. 13–14 as a crucial parallel to 7. 7–12: Schrenk, 'Ἐντρολή', 551 (chap. 5 is 'indispensable as a key to R. 7'); Grundmann, 'Ἀμαρτάνω', 310; Benoit, 'La Loi', 486–7; Feuillet, 'La plan salvifique', 371–2; Schoeps, *Paul*, 191; F. J. Leenhardt, *The Epistle to the Romans* (Cleveland and New York: World, 1961) 186. In addition to 5. 13–14, Michel (*Römer*, 227) compares also 4. 15. The objections of E. Brandenburger (*Adam und Christus: Exegetisch-Religionsgeschichtliche Untersuchung zu Röm. 5:12–21 [1 Kor 15]* [WMANT 7; Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener, 1962] 209–214) to the juxtaposition of 5. 13–14 and 7. 7–12 are based on his own understanding of the former text and on an unjustified insistence that ἐξων must be given a theological meaning. If, then, Brandenburger's interpretation of 5. 13–14 is rejected, there is no reason to refrain from comparing the two texts (Käsemann, *Romans*, 196–7).

[44] While it is possible that the preposition ἀνά has lost its basic force ('again') (Cranfield, *Romans*, 1.352; Käsemann, *Romans*, 197), the only other occurrence of the verb in Paul (Rom 13. 9) and the contrast with νεκρός ('inactive'; cf. Jas 2. 26) suggest that the verb should be translated 'sprang back to life'. In this case, the reference may be back to Adam (Lambrecht, 'Romans

7', 24; Wright, 'Messiah and People of God', 151) or, with the Adamic view, to the sin which, according to Jewish tradition, was already dormant in Adam (B. J. Malina, 'Some Observations on the Origin of Sin in Judaism and St. Paul', *CBQ* 31 [1969] 30-1).

[45] See Stendahl's strictures on over-individualizing interpretations of Paul's discussion of the law ('Introspective Conscience', 80-8).

[46] The other alternative is to give *ἐξων* a relative force (Benoit, 'La Loi', 487: man lives before the law in the sense 'd'une vie relative en ce sens qu'il n'est pas en rébellion ouverte contre Dieu et surtout qu'il n'est pas sous le joug du *θάνατος* imposé seulement par le péché formel'. Cf. also Cranfield, *Romans*, 1.351-2).

[47] On the power of the *torah* to give life, see *Pirqé 'Abot*. 6. 7 ('Great is torah, for it gives to them that practice it life in this world and in the world to come'); Pss Sol 14. 2; Bar 3. 9; *Lev. Rab.* 18,3; *Exod. Rab.* 32,1; *t. Šabb.* 15,17 and the discussion in E. E. Urbach, *The Sages: Their Concepts and Beliefs* (2 vols.; Jerusalem: Magnes, 1979), 1.424-6 and Schoeps, *Paul*, 175. E. P. Sanders (*Paul and Palestinian Judaism: A Comparison of Patterns of Religion* [Philadelphia: Fortress, 1977]) has contested the view that early Palestinian Judaism saw the law as a means of earning salvation; the law was rather the means of maintaining one's place in the covenant. This is not the place to discuss his thesis and for our purposes it is not crucial to distinguish the earning from the maintaining of covenant life.

[48] *b. Šabb.* 145b-146a (see Urbach, *Sages*, 1.429-430).

[49] *b. Qidd.* 30b: 'Even so did the Holy One, blessed be He, speak unto Israel: "My children, I created the evil desire but I [also] created the torah as its antidote; if you occupy yourselves with the torah, you will not be delivered into its hand"' (see Moore, *Judaism*, 1.491).

[50] We presume that Paul views Israel's sinning as transgressions against the law. Bultmann ('Romans 7', 154; *Theology*, 1.262-4) followed by others (Bornkamm, 'Sin, Law and Death', 90-1; R. Jewett, *Paul's Anthropological Terms: A Study of their Use in Conflict Settings* [AGJU 10; Leiden: Brill, 1971] 145-6) has argued that this sinning involves especially the 'sin against grace', the effort to fulfil the law as a means of securing righteousness. However, while Paul castigates Israel for seeking a righteousness based on the law (Rom 9. 30-10. 4), it is not clear that he regarded attempts to fulfil the law as in themselves wrong (see U. Wilckens, 'Was heißt bei Paulus: "Aus Werken des Gesetzes wird kein Mensch gerecht"'? *Rechtfertigung als Freiheit: Paulusstudien* [Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener, 1974]). In any case, this 'nomistic' concept is probably not present in Romans 7. The phrase *τὰ παθήματα τῶν ἁμαρτιῶν* (v. 5) can only with difficulty be understood as sinful 'strivings' and the terms *ἐπιθυμία*, *ἐπιθυμῶ* (vv. 7, 8) clearly designate in Paul behaviour which is contrary to the law. Moreover, clear differences in vocabulary and conception exist between Romans 7 and texts said to speak of the 'nomistic' sin. (For these points and others, see especially: H. Räisänen, 'Zum Gebrauch von ΕΠΙΘΥΜΙΑ und ΕΠΙΘΥΜΕΙΝ bei Paulus', *ST* 33 (1979) 85-99; Beker, *Paul the Apostle*, 238-40; Ridderbos, *Paul*, 146; Wright, 'Messiah and People of God', 147-8).

[51] O. Modalsli, 'Gal. 2,19-21; 5,16-18 und Röm. 7,7-25', *TZ* 21 (1965) 32; Schrenk, 'Ἐντρολή', 551; Brandenburger, *Adam und Christus*, 215-16; Wright, 'Messiah and People of God', 95-6; Leenhardt, *Romans*, 186-8.

[52] The use of *ἐξαπαράω* in v. 11 is generally seen as the most obvious linguistic allusion to Genesis 3, since Paul uses this verb with reference to the Paradise narrative in 2 Cor 9. 3 and 1 Tim 2. 14. But Paul also uses the verb three times with no reference to Genesis (Rom 16. 18; 1 Cor 3. 18; 2 Thess 3. 3), so the allusion is not certain (Kümmel, *Römer* 7, 54).

[53] Philo, *Som.* 1.176; Rom 3. 5 (first person plural), 3. 7; 1 Cor 9. 31-32; 3. 1-3; 13. 11; Gal 2. 18.

[54] Dem., *Kata Philippou* 3. 9, 17; Ps. Xen., *Re Publica Atheniensium* 1.11 and 2.11 (with explicit hypothetical constructions also); 1 Cor 6. 15; 10. 29-30; 13. 15.

[55] 1 Cor 6. 12 (probably a 'slogan' of the libertine party).

[56] Kümmel admits this for the three rabbinic texts (*m. Ber.* 1.3; *b. Ber.* 3a; *m. 'Abot* vi 9). The first and third are (possibly) fictitious narratives used for purposes of illustration; the second occurs in the recounting of a vision. Kümmel appears to assume, incorrectly, that the use of a narrative to make a point constitutes evidence against an autobiographical understanding.

[57] See K. S. Kuhn, 'New Light on Temptation, Sin and Flesh in the New Testament', *The Scrolls and the New Testament* (ed. K. Stendahl; New York: Harper & Row, 1957) 102; Longenecker, *Paul*, 88-9.

[58] See H. Bardtke, 'Considerations sur les cantiques de Qumrân (1)', *RB* 63 (1956) 220-33 and, on 1QH 3. 24-26, S. Holm-Nielsen, *Hodayot: Psalms from Qumran* (Acta Theologica Danica 2; Aarhus: Universitetsforlaget, 1960) 75.

[59] Others who see the need to retain some autobiographical influence in Romans 7 (among recent contributions): Bandstra, *Law*, 136; Ridderbos, *Paul*, 130; Dunn, 'Romans 7', 260; Campbell, 'The Identity of ἐγώ', 59-60; Gundry, 'Moral Frustration', 229; A. Feuillet, 'Le Règne de la Mort et le Règne de la vie (Rom. V,12-21)', *RB* 77 (1970) 512; F. F. Bruce, *Paul: Apostle of the Heart Set Free* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1977) 198; Dahl, *Studies in Paul*, 93; D. Wenham, 'The Christian Life: A Life of Tension? A Consideration of the Nature of Christian Experience in Paul', *Pauline Studies*, 89. Beker makes an important point when he asserts that Paul's depiction of pre-Christian existence in Romans 7 must have some 'foothold' in Paul's own experience if it is to possess validity (*Paul the Apostle*, 241 and cf. also S. Kim, *The Origin of Paul's Gospel* (WUNT 2, 4; Tübingen: Mohr, 1981) 53-5). And note N. Turner's characterization of the Pauline ἐγώ: 'Paul instances both himself and his reader in a vivid way to illustrate a point, not intending to apply what is said literally to himself or his reader . . .' (*Syntax: Vol. 3 of A Grammar of New Testament Greek* by J. H. Moulton [Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1963] 39).

[60] For this idea, see Stauffer, 'Εγώ', 361-2 (and also Strelan, 'Background of Romans 7:7', 24-5). The combination of autobiographical and salvation-historical references in the ἐγώ of Romans vii is suggested also by A. Vergote ('Apport des données psychanalytiques à l'exégèse: voi, loi et clivage du moi dans l'épître aux Romains 7', *Exégèse et Herméneutique* [ed. R. Barthes, et al.; Paris: Seuil, 1971] 120-8), although from a very different perspective and with differences of emphasis.

[61] U. Luz, *Das Geschichtsverständnis des Paulus* (BEVT 49; Munich: Kaiser, 1968) 159, n. 87.

[62] By including Paul in the scope of ἐγώ, we are able to give a natural interpretation of the personal struggle depicted in 7. 15-20. The failure of the redemptive-historical view at this point has been a chief criticism of the view.

[63] Against Lyonnet, Lambrecht ('Romans 7', 28) correctly stresses that Paul's salvation-historical scheme focuses on the era of the law as a separate entity.