
CHAPTER FIVE
THE PROBLEM OF *SENSUS*
PLENIOR

Douglas J. Moo

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Douglas J. Moo is Associate Professor of New Testament at Trinity Evangelical Divinity School, Deerfield, Illinois. He is a graduate of DePauw University (B.A.), Trinity Evangelical Divinity School (M.Div.), and the University of St. Andrews (Ph.D.). He has authored *The Old Testament in the Gospel Passion Narratives* and *The Epistle of James: An Introduction and Commentary* (TNTC) and co-authored *The Rapture: Pre-, Mid-, or Post-Tribulational?*

CHAPTER FIVE

THE PROBLEM OF SENSUS PLENIOR

I. INTRODUCTION

No factor is cited as an argument against the inerrancy of Scripture more often than the Bible itself. Whatever conclusions about the nature of Scripture that can be demonstrated by theological deduction or on the basis of the claims of the Bible for itself must be tested against the data of the text. And, many conclude, when these phenomena are considered, the idea that the Bible is true in all that it affirms becomes clearly impossible. Careful, objective study of the text reveals numerous errors of one kind or another—historical inaccuracies, discrepancies between the scriptural record and the findings of modern science, and, above all, contradictions between and within biblical books.

Inerrantists, it is often alleged, are guilty either of sweeping these phenomena under the rug of pure deduction or of doing a disservice to the biblical text by foisting on it unlikely and sometimes fantastic harmonistic explanations in order to save their theory. This criticism comes from some within the inerrancy camp as well as from those without. Robert Gundry, for instance, finds numerous clear, theologically motivated contradictions between Matthew on the one hand and Mark and Luke on the other. He criticizes fellow Evangelicals for failing to take seriously the force of this evidence and concludes that inerrancy can be upheld only by adopting the extreme (and most unlikely) hypothesis that Matthew has written in a "midrashic" style and is therefore often uninterested in reporting historical fact.¹ More typically, the weight of the phenomena is held to invalidate the notion of inerrancy altogether. As William Abraham put it, "[The doctrine of inerrancy] involves enormous strain when it comes into contact with inductive study of the text. Indeed the strain is too great for any reasonable person to want to bear."²

What may be said in reply to such a claim? "Induction"—the process by which theological conclusions are drawn only as they emerge from the data—certainly has a legitimate place in formulating a doctrine of Scripture. But two things need to be said. First, as Warfield pointed out long ago, the claims made by the biblical authors for their writings is also evidence from the texts, capable of being

molded into an inductively based argument for the nature of Scripture. *Some parts* of the phenomena of the text may present a problem; but it is wrong to cast the issue as one of induction versus deduction.³ Second, it should be recognized that induction and deduction need to be used together in formulating a doctrine of Scripture; not even "pure" scientists use induction *to the exclusion of* deduction in the construction of theoretical models.⁴

Nevertheless, it is true that *all* the phenomena of the biblical text must ultimately be considered in the formulation of a satisfactory doctrine of Scripture. Too many discrepancies between these phenomena and the doctrine of inerrancy would cast serious doubt on the validity of the doctrine. But, though often claimed, it is by no means clear that the phenomena of Scripture present so great a problem for the view that the Bible is completely truthful. Specific issues relative to this problem are dealt with in several essays in these two volumes: here, however, I will examine the problem created by the use of the Old Testament in the New. Long a matter of fascination, perplexity, and fruitful study to Christian preachers, theologians, and laypeople, the general issue of the Old Testament in the New has received much scholarly attention in the last forty years.⁵ Numerous offshoots of the problem have taken root in the course of the discussion, involving textual criticism, hermeneutics, and Jewish exegetical history, to name only three of the more important.

The implications of the subject for the nature of Scripture have also received considerable attention. Of specific interest to us is the allegation that the way in which the New Testament uses the Old Testament is incompatible with the notion that the Bible is completely true in all that it teaches. Paul Achtemeier's statement of the case is typical. To attribute inerrancy to the books of the Bible, he claims, is to ignore the New Testament authors' attitude to the Old Testament, as demonstrated in their actual use of the Old Testament. Their frequent modifications of the Old Testament text and their habit of reading into that text meanings obviously not intended in the original demonstrate clearly that they did not regard the Old Testament as an eternal, unchanging, inerrant document. Rather, Achtemeier argues, their use of the Old Testament shows that the New Testament authors regarded the canonical books as part of a living tradition that could be freely modified in order to fit new situations. If we would be true to the New Testament itself, then, we will not impose on the Bible a static, oracular status such as the doctrine of inerrancy implies; we will view it and use it as the living, changing, tradition that it is.⁶

In formulating his argument, Achtemeier has two specific phenomena in mind: (1) places where the New Testament uses a text form of an Old Testament passage that differs from the accepted Masoretic tradition and (2) places where the New Testament gives a

meaning to an Old Testament passage that does not appear to agree with the intention of the original. That the issues are intertwined is obvious: new meanings are often given to an Old Testament passage by means of a change in text. However, since Moisés Silva has dealt competently with the textual side of the problem in his essay "The New Testament Use of the Old Testament" in *Scripture and Truth*, we will focus in this essay on the second issue. To put the problem simply: how can we accord complete truthfulness to writings that appear to misunderstand and misapply those texts from which they claim to derive the authority and rationale for their most basic claims and teaching? Although not always framed in just this way, this question has been one that has challenged Christian theologians from the earliest days of the church. We would do well to glance at some of the more important responses to this issue in the history of theology.

II. SOME HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

A. REJECTION OF THE OLD TESTAMENT

The appropriation of the Old Testament by the New Testament is one aspect, or manifestation, of a larger theological issue: the relation between the Testaments, in particular the degree to which, and manner in which, the Old Testament can be considered a "Christian" book. Of course, some—Marcion in the ancient church, Harnack more recently—have rid themselves of the problem by essentially dismissing the Old Testament from the Christian canon. But this radical alternative has wisely been rejected by the vast majority of Christian theologians. For, in a very important sense, the identity and viability of Christianity itself hinges on its relationship to the Old Testament. Jesus was none other than the Messiah of the Old Testament, and this meant that the church was forced to find a "Christian" meaning of the Old Testament.

B. ALLEGORIZATION

The method that quickly became the most important way of finding this "Christian" meaning was allegorization. Allegory finds meanings hidden behind the words of the text; the text is treated as a series of symbols that provides the discerning reader with a "higher" or "deeper" meaning. Origen's role in making the allegorical approach *the* Christian approach to the Old Testament was central. Without denying the "literal" sense, he held up the "spiritual" sense as ultimately the most important. This sense, however, could be perceived only by the spiritually "enlightened."⁷ Since this method takes the New Testament as the "code" that provides the insight into the "spiritual" meaning of the Old Testament, there was naturally no "problem" in the way the New Testament used the Old.

While the allegorical method, then, quickly came to dominate patristic interpretation of the Old Testament—as Henri de Lubac says, “The so-called mystical or allegorical meaning was always considered as the doctrinal meaning *par excellence*”⁸—other options were explored. The “Antiochene” school is well-known for its opposition to the excesses of Alexandrian allegory. In place of allegory, they advocated a more historically based *theoria* concept, according to which the Old Testament author’s own vision was seen as embracing both the ultimate Christian fulfillment and his immediate perspective.⁹ Still, the Antiochenes saw this Christian meaning as a “higher sense” beyond the literal meaning, and their differences from the dominant Alexandrian approach must not be overemphasized.¹⁰

The ultimate codification of the allegorical approach came with the formulation (by about the fifth century) of the famous *quadriga* (“four horse chariot”), which outlined the four meanings to be found in every Old Testament text: (1) the literal meaning, (2) the “allegorical” meaning (the most important basis for doctrine), (3) the “tropological” meaning (specifying the moral implications of the text), and (4) the “anagogical” meaning (which provided the eschatological focus of the text).¹¹ In practice, the basic distinction was between the “literal” and the “spiritual” sense—or, to use the terms that often were associated with the two meanings, the “letter” and the “spirit.” A central motivating factor in the insistence on the spiritual sense was the need for the church to show that its interpretation was the “correct” meaning of the Old Testament, over against both the merely literal, “Judaizing” interpretation of the Jews and the literal but disparaging interpretations of the Gnostics.¹²

As some Christians became reacquainted with Jewish interpretations—and some, including Andrew of St. Victor (twelfth century), adopted many of them—the relationship of the literal and spiritual sense was explored anew.¹³ Thomas Aquinas’ solution was widely received. The literal sense is based on the *words* of Scripture and should include all that those words may signify by means of metaphor, symbolism, and the like. The spiritual sense, on the other hand, is found in the *things* to which the words refer. Since the Bible is the only book with both a human and a divine author, only it can possess this twofold sense.¹⁴

Others, however, insisted that the “spiritual,” Christian sense was the *only* true, literal sense, while some, more interested in finding better historical justification for the Christian interpretation, proposed a “double literal sense.” James Perez of Valencia (d. 1490) distinguished between the grammatical sense and the hidden sense spoken by the Spirit—an idea resembling the currently popular *sensus plenior* approach that will be examined below.¹⁵ These different proposals seem to be trying to take the “spiritualizing”

approach to the Old Testament that had become standard and to put it on solid footings by providing some systematic hermeneutical foundations for the process.

C. THE REFORMATION

As is well-known, a key ingredient in the Reformers' interpretation of Scripture was their general rejection of the traditional "spiritual" meaning. Luther, after "driving" the "four horse chariot" in his early biblical expositions, violently rejected the system. Indeed, James Samuel Preus has argued that Luther's recovery of a genuine historical appreciation for the Old Testament was a prime factor in his theology and deeply significant for the course of the Reformation.¹⁶ Luther gave to Old Testament Israel a religious experience in its own right; and the Old Testament was viewed not simply as a quarry for Christian symbolism but as a book with its own significance. This meant, in practice, that Luther was freed from the necessity of using an allegorical method to find Christian meaning in the Old Testament; he recaptured a genuine sense of salvation history. Thus, Luther's interpretations, as Heinrich Bornkamm says, are characterized above all by a "comprehensive prophetic application of the Old Testament to Christ."¹⁷ If anything, Calvin was even more insistent on the importance of the literal sense, as his many fine biblical commentaries demonstrate.

Still, the Reformers and their followers certainly did not abandon allegory entirely. Luther approves of an allegorical interpretation where theological sense can be derived from a text in no other way; and the "hermeneutical textbook" written by the Lutheran Flacius (d. 1575) contains limited approval for allegorical methods. In addition, Protestant interpreters retained a *sensus mysticus* or *spiritualis* alongside the *sensus literalis*, although there was concern to distinguish this secondary sense from Roman Catholic notions of the mystical sense by insisting that it was part of the one sense intended by the true author of Scripture, the Holy Spirit.¹⁸ The centuries of "Protestant orthodoxy" (not to be as sharply distinguished from the sixteenth-century Reformers as is all too common) saw a continuation of these methods, with a greater emphasis in some circles on "typology" as a hermeneutical key. The "Cocceian" school is especially famous for an overuse of typology, in which petty details of the Old Testament text were accorded symbolic significance.¹⁹

D. "SCIENTIFIC" HISTORICAL EXEGESIS

Throughout the period we have surveyed, most theologians, however they explained the relationship, assumed that the New Testament use of the Old Testament was valid and authoritative. This assumption began to be seriously challenged in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.²⁰ With the onset of higher criticism, the New

Testament use of the Old came in for even more criticism. Insistence on the "grammatical-historical" meaning as the *only* legitimate meaning of the text sounded the death knell for an approach that gave theological meaning to the Old Testament mainly by means of spiritualizing exegesis or by reading back into it the meaning found there by the New Testament.²¹ No longer, naturally, was the New Testament interpretation of Old Testament texts considered, *ipso facto*, to be the correct interpretation. Where the New Testament interpretation of the Old differed from the findings of modern, "scientific" historical exegesis, so much the worse for the New Testament. New Testament exegesis of the Old Testament was no longer considered to provide the normative key by which the unity of the Testaments could be asserted; and the New Testament authors were accused of arbitrary and illegitimate exegetical procedures.

E. REACTIONS TO THIS "RATIONALISM"

Responses to this new attitude were numerous and varied. From the Protestant side, J. C. K. von Hofmann sought to reassert the unity of the Testaments by demonstrating that the Scripture presents as its basic structure a *Heilsgeschichte* (a "history of salvation") and that this historical process is what binds the Testaments together as anticipation and realization.²² The title of Ernst W. Hengstenberg's magisterial survey, *The Christology of the Old Testament*, reveals that he, too, is convinced of the essential unity of the Testaments: they both, in different ways, speak of Jesus the Messiah.²³ Patrick Fairbairn advocated a properly defined, sober use of typology as an explanation for the correspondence between Old Testament and New.²⁴ From the Roman Catholic side, John H. Newman strongly criticized "rationalists" for denuding the text of its spiritual import by refusing to go beyond the literal sense. He argued that it was necessary to recapture the early church emphasis on the "mystical" sense as the clue to the divine intention in Scripture.²⁵ Similar proposals have been made by Henri de Lubac and Jean Daniélou.²⁶ Other responses to the difficulty will be canvassed below.

III. INITIAL CONSIDERATIONS

The problem, then, with which we are dealing is very much a modern one—the product *not*, it should be emphasized, of a new, innovative way to view Scripture but of the modern insistence on the "historical" sense as the only legitimate meaning of a text.

A. A FIDEISTIC APPROACH

One way, then, of dealing with the problem, advocated both by some Protestants and some Roman Catholics, is to argue that it is the

modern view of exegetical procedure, not the New Testament, that is at fault. The revelatory stance of the New Testament is the validation for their interpretations; and when we cannot discover this meaning in the Old Testament through our exegetical techniques, then we should either abandon that method or else admit the inadequacy of it.²⁷

There is no doubt some point to this proposal. The danger of "modern snobbishness"—the conviction that only we moderns have somehow transcended cultural bias and are uniquely able to understand things correctly—is real. As Moisés Silva reminds us, we must be careful not to think that "the authority and validity of apostolic interpretation . . . depend on its conformity to modern exegetical method."²⁸ In this, as in all other matters, Scripture itself must judge our understanding, not we it; and ultimately, we will conclude, it is impossible to "validate" the New Testament use of the Old, in general or in detail, without a prior decision to accept what they say as true and authoritative.

But while this kind of response is, at a certain level, adequate for the problem, it is ultimately less than satisfactory. First, constant dismissal of these kinds of problems by appeal to the uncertainties and fallibility of all knowledge—the record of ancient history is far from complete, modern science could very well be wrong, etc.—while appropriate to a degree, would in the last resort place Scripture in a realm above any real historical investigation or criticism. At some point, the weight of unexplained discrepancies would be too much for the doctrine to bear. Moreover, if apparent discrepancies between our reading of the Old Testament and the apostles' reading are dismissed out of hand because of the fallibility of our interpretation, we are in a rather vicious circle; for we can know what the apostles' interpretation of the Old Testament is only by using those same methods that we have rejected.

A second reason for wanting to go beyond the fideistic course outlined above is that the New Testament appeal to the Old Testament is too basic to the church's very identity to leave it in the realm of unexplained assertion. For all our legitimate emphasis on Christ as the center and fulfillment of revelation and as the "hermeneutical key" to the Old Testament, we sacrifice too much by refusing to allow the Old Testament to stand, to some extent at least, as an independent witness to the New. J. A. Sanders puts it well: "All the while that we insist that nothing is exempt from the judgment of Christ—even our faith-understanding of the Old Testament—we must remember that the Old Testament was and, in some sense, is the criterion whereby Christ is Christ."²⁹ How can the church's claim that it, not Judaism, is the true "completion" of the Old Testament be validated if its (rather than Judaism's) use of the Old Testament cannot be shown to best accord with the meaning of the Old Testament?

B. THE SUBJECTIVITY APPROACH

Another possible response to the problem is to eliminate it by recourse to the inevitable subjectivity of all meaning and interpretation. A. T. Hanson, in dealing with this issue, for instance, criticizes the notion that there is any "correct" meaning of a text, arguing that one's presuppositions (one's *Vorverständnis*) decisively determine the meaning one arrives at.³⁰ It is true, as we will argue below, that presuppositions play a critical role in the way the Old Testament is read and applied. And it is also true that one's presuppositions about what the Old Testament is saying are due in part to faith rather than to unaided reason. But without gainsaying any of this, we must insist that presuppositions themselves can and must be adjusted to "fit" the material under investigation: the "horizon" of the text and that of the interpreter *can* be "fused." Thus, without denying the problem of subjectivity in interpretation, the notion that a "correct" interpretation of a text exists and can be found is both reasonable and necessary.³¹

What we can say, however, is that our ultimate decision about the validity of the New Testament use of the Old will depend considerably on our decision to reject or accept the presuppositions on which the detailed applications of specific texts are based. These presuppositions must themselves, of course, be evaluated; and one of the ways to test them is to consider whether their acceptance leads to a more natural understanding of the Old Testament than, say, the presuppositions at work in the Qumran community or among the rabbis. The process is inevitably circular, but the circle is not a closed one. We want to "break into" it at the level of the actual use of the Old Testament in the New, consider this use in light of certain fundamental theological and hermeneutical presuppositions, and show that, granted these presuppositions, the interpretations given these texts need not be considered erroneous.

We conclude, then, that the apparently novel meaning attributed to Old Testament texts by Jesus and the writers of the New Testament *do* constitute a potentially legitimate objection to the inerrancy of Scripture. Theirs was no casual appeal or an argument by analogy: they repeatedly assert that we are to believe or do certain things *because* of the witness of specific Old Testament texts. It is the frequently *causal* relationship between New Testament claim or teaching and Old Testament text that makes the problem a different one than that which Silva illustrates by appeal to news reports juxtaposing the Miami riots and the eruption of Mount Saint Helens in 1980.³² Those reports did not claim either that the volcanic eruption in Washington state caused the riots in Florida or that we must understand the riots in a certain specific way because of the mountain's eruption. If the New Testament errs in drawing these

relationships, then it has erred in a fundamental way—affecting, by the way, not just incidentals but very basic matters “of faith and practice.” S. Lewis Johnson is right: the doctrine of inerrancy “requires that the meaning the New Testament author finds in the Old Testament and uses in the New is really in the Old Testament.”³³

It will be the purpose of this study to investigate this idea of New-Testament-specified meaning being “really in” the Old Testament. On what basis does the New Testament so confidently apply text after text from the Old Testament? Before analyzing some of the most important explanations of the situation, it will be helpful to clear the way by removing what might be called some “phantom” difficulties.

IV. CORRECTLY DEFINING THE PROBLEM

Statements of the problem posed by the use of the Old Testament in the New for the doctrine of Scripture frequently magnify the difficulties by failing to take into account certain important factors. We will examine some of the most important of these.

A. THE NATURE OF INSPIRATION

Implicit in some discussions of the issue is the assumption that inerrancy necessarily involves a “dictation” theory of inspiration. Bruce Vawter, arguing that the New Testament exhibits great freedom in interpreting the Old Testament as a witness to Christ, goes on to say: “Clearly this was not done out of any belief that the prophetic word that it adapted so plastically was in any sense the oracular utterance of a delphic spirit, a word voiced from heaven fixed and immutable, once for all.”³⁴ Now, as is well known, the vast majority of inerrantists do not assume a mechanical, dictation-type of inspiration theory such as Vawter’s quotation implies. The words of Scripture are viewed as the product of a “concurative” operation whereby the human author freely wrote what he wanted while the divine author at the same time superintended and guided that writing. Once it is recognized, then, that the view of inspiration held by inerrantists does not entail the notion of an ahistorical, “oracular” process, scope for flexibility in quotation and attention to historical context can be allowed without invalidating inerrancy.³⁵ This, of course, does not solve all the problems that Vawter finds, but it does remove at least one of his objections.

B. THE NATURE AND PURPOSE OF REFERENCES TO THE OLD TESTAMENT

Another way in which the scope of the problem is illegitimately expanded is by a failure to recognize the many different purposes for which New Testament writers cite the Old Testament. Authors and

speakers “quote” for many reasons, not all of which depend for their legitimacy on the quotation being given an interpretation or application completely in accord with the original context. For instance, if I warn my children about the consequences of an action by reminding them that “what they sow they shall also reap,” my applying Paul’s words to a situation that he clearly never envisaged does not hurt the effectiveness of the warning. My intention was not to quote Paul as an authority, providing legitimate substantiation of my warning, but to borrow his language in order to express vividly my caution.

What is crucial is to determine whether the author intends to assert the “correct” meaning of the text and whether the “correct” interpretation of the text is necessary for the point that the author is making. Only in such cases does an apparent misinterpretation of a text create difficulty. Granted the prominence played by the Old Testament in the lives and cultural milieu of New Testament authors, it is more than probable that they frequently used scriptural language other than as authoritative proof. When in such cases they appear to deduce a new meaning from the text or apply it to a new situation, it is unjustifiable to accuse them of misusing the text or to infer from their usage that they did not think the text was inerrant. We will examine some specific categories of usage that should not, for this reason, be included in our consideration of the problem.³⁶

1. Use of Scriptural Language as a Vehicle of Expression

Much like the speech of a person raised on the classics will be sprinkled with terminology and idioms drawn from those texts, New Testament writers often—without intending to provide a “correct” interpretation of the Old Testament text—use Old Testament language as a vehicle of expression. Such usage will often suggest a certain atmosphere or underlying concept that is important for what the speaker or writer is trying to communicate.

We may take Jesus’ words of lament in Gethsemane as an example: *perilypos estin hē psychē mou heōs thanatou* (“My soul is sorrowful, even unto death,” Mk 14:34/Mt 26:38). The rarity of *perilypos* (only eight times in the LXX, never in Philo or Josephus, only twice in the NT), especially in combination with *psychē*, renders an allusion to the “refrain” of Psalms 42 and 43 (perhaps originally a single psalm) virtually certain.³⁷ But there is little evidence that we should find in Jesus’ allusion an attempt to cite the psalm(s) as authoritative prefiguration of His sufferings in the Garden. Jesus appears simply to be using familiar biblical language to express His emotions. To be sure, Jesus’ use of this language may suggest a general identification of His plight with the psalmist’s—oppressed by enemies, seeking God’s vindication and rescue—but we would be wrong to accuse him of misusing the text or reading into it new meaning if we were to find no evidence that Psalms 42–43 were

predictive of Jesus' agony in Gethsemane. Moisés Silva cites Paul's use of Deuteronomy 19:15 in 2 Corinthians 13:1 as a similar case.³⁸ Realizing the familiarity of all the New Testament authors with the Old Testament, we can expect many such instances; and none is germane to the issue discussed here.

2. The Application or Accommodation of Old Testament Principles

In his important study of hermeneutics, E. D. Hirsch describes the idea of what he calls a "willed type." This involves the extension or application of an author's language, particularly in legal texts, such that the application is not part of the author's specific, conscious intention but at the same time can legitimately be seen as included within the author's general meaning.³⁹ This phenomenon can be observed in places where the New Testament applies an Old Testament principle or law to a new situation.

As an example of one such instance, we can take Paul's oft-criticized quotation of Deuteronomy 25:4 ("Do not muzzle an ox while it is treading out the grain") in support of giving money to Christian ministers (1Co 9:9). First, it is considered fanciful in the extreme that a law providing for the welfare of animals should be applied by Paul to the Christian ministry; and, second, he appears categorically to deny in his next words that the law had anything to do with animals: "Is it for oxen that God is concerned? Does he not speak entirely for our sake? It was written for our sake" (RSV). Here Paul appears to equate the "literal" sense with the "spiritual," Christian sense.

Numerous explanations of Paul's procedure have been offered. Longenecker sees this as one of the few examples of allegory in Paul.⁴⁰ Others think that Paul has adopted a Hellenistic Jewish exegetical principle by which interpreters such as Philo were able to avoid the crassly literal sense of such laws by appealing to the "higher sense" really intended by God.⁴¹ Walter Kaiser, however, expanding on the approach taken by Calvin and Godet, argues that Paul's use of the text depends strictly on the original meaning of the text, which in its context is intended to inculcate in masters and owners a concern for their laborers (whether animal or human). What Paul does is to draw out in a legitimate way the *significance* of the law for the situation of churches and their "workers." Paul is also right, then, in claiming that the law is given for "us" (e.g., human beings), not (primarily) the oxen.⁴² Moreover, Paul is probably not saying that this is the *only* meaning of the law; the crucial word *pantōs* is best translated not "entirely" (as in the RSV) but "certainly" or "undoubtedly."⁴³

Another possibility is that the phrase had become a popular proverb to express the idea that a worker deserves to be paid. In this case, Paul's application would not have to cohere in any sense with the original, since his purpose in quoting it had nothing to do with

the authority of the text as God's law. While there is some evidence for the proverbial use of the phrase, Paul's use of it appears to go further than this. In either case, however, Paul cannot be accused of misusing the text. To claim that the application of a law beyond anything the original author specifically intended is a misinterpretation of that law is to apply an unfairly rigid concept of meaning. A better test is to seek to determine whether the application can legitimately be included in the scope of the law—whether the original author, if asked, would have acknowledged the validity of the further application.

3. Old Testament Texts That Are Cited to Represent Alternative Points of View

That some statements in 1 Corinthians are not so much Paul's own teaching as slogans of the Corinthians is generally recognized (e.g., "all things are lawful" [6:12; 10:23 RSV]; "it is well for a man not to touch a woman" [7:1 RSV]; "all of us possess knowledge" [8:1 RSV]). In a similar manner, it may be that some Old Testament quotations are used not to express the teaching of the author but to represent the opinion or teaching of someone else.

At least some of the quotations set in antithesis to Jesus' teaching in Matthew 5 are to be so explained. The clearest instance of this is the final quotation (Mt 5:43), in which the addition of "hate your enemies" to the love commandment of Leviticus 19:15 expresses the teaching current among some Jews (perhaps Essenes).⁴⁴ Here, of course, clear contextual indicators are present: the addition of language not found in the Old Testament (nor fairly representative of Old Testament teaching) and the introductory formula, "you have heard that it was said," which suggests something of a distance from the Old Testament *per se*.

In situations where contextual indicators of this sort are not present, the hypothesis that an author quotes the Old Testament to represent the opinion of his listeners or opponents must be advanced with great caution. Nevertheless, the possibility cannot be excluded when this option offers the best explanation of the flow of an author's thought. Thus, as Silva points out in his essay, the difficulty of Paul's quotation of Leviticus 18:5 (Gal 3:12; Ro 10:5), where the original sense of the passage appears to be disregarded and where a straightforward reading creates an apparent conflict with what Paul says elsewhere about the law (cf. Gal 3:21), has led a number of expositors to view the quotation as a slogan drawn from the apostle's Judaizing opponents.⁴⁵

Interestingly, both Achtemeier and Vawter cite this quotation as a clear instance of misuse of the Old Testament in the New.⁴⁶ Now it is entirely possible that the explanation of this quotation given above is incorrect. And, as a general principle, the adoption of an interpretation that attributes the words of a book to the author's opponents

should be supported by compelling evidence—clear contextual indicators or the conclusion that the only way to make any sense of a passage is to read it in this way. The alternative we are considering here, then, will not help us with our problem very often. Nevertheless, the category should be considered as a possibility when faced with a difficult quotation; and it is instructive that neither Vawter nor Achtemeier even mentions this alternative in criticizing Paul's use of Leviticus 18:5.

C. THE MEANING OF FULFILLMENT LANGUAGE

As one instance of the misuse of the Old Testament in the New, Dewey Beegle cites Matthew's use of Hosea 11:1 to furnish "authoritative proof from the Old Testament for an event in the life of Jesus."⁴⁷ The quotation in question is one of Matthew's well-known "formula citations," a body of quotations that offers more textual and hermeneutical difficulty than any others in the New Testament.⁴⁸ The stay of Jesus and His family in Egypt, and their subsequent return to Palestine, "fulfills," according to Matthew, Hosea's statement, "Out of Egypt have I called my son" (Mt 2:15 *RSV*).

Many things could be said about this frequently discussed quotation, but what I want to focus on here is the use of *plēroō* to introduce it. Although Beegle does not explain why he thinks that Matthew regards the citation as an "authoritative proof," it is probable that it is the use of *plēroō* that is decisive. Indeed, it is common to think that the "fulfillment" of the Old Testament in Jesus' advent refers basically to His doing and saying what specific Old Testament prophecies said the Messiah would do or say. And if this is so, Matthew 2:15 presents a problem, since Hosea 11:1 appears to be a simple statement of fact and gives no indication of being a "prophecy" of the Messiah's departure from Egypt.

But, in fact, *plēroō* cannot be confined to so narrow a compass. The word is used in the New Testament to indicate the broad redemptive-historical relationship of the new, climactic revelation of God in Christ to the preparatory, incomplete revelation to and through Israel.⁴⁹ Thus, Mark can summarize Jesus' preaching as an announcement that time itself had been "filled up" and the kingdom of God was at hand (1:15); Jesus claims that His teaching is the ultimate, climactic expression of the will of God to which the Old Testament law pointed (Mt 5:17; cf. Mt 11:13).⁵⁰ What needs to be emphasized, then, is that the use of *plēroō* in an introductory formula need not mean that the author regards the Old Testament text he quotes as a direct prophecy; and accusations that a New Testament author misuses the Old Testament by using *plēroō* to introduce nonprophetic texts are unfounded. In the case of Matthew 2:15, then, the Evangelist may be suggesting that Jesus, God's "greater son," brings to a climax—"fills up"—the "Exodus motif," that had become, even in the Old Testament, an eschatologically oriented theme.⁵¹

The factors we have enumerated in the preceding paragraphs serve to reduce the scope of the problem we are considering. While some "conservatives" can justly be accused of forcing exegetically unlikely harmonizations on texts to preserve doctrinal purity, many of a more critical bent err in the opposite direction by failing to make sufficient allowance for these and other factors of similar sort. Nevertheless, the considerations we have cited mitigate but by no means eliminate the problem. There remain numerous passages in which the force of the author's argument depends on an Old Testament text being given its proper, authoritative meaning—when cited in support of theological conclusions, or where the author says specifically that the text prophesied the event he narrates, for instance—and yet where the author appears to give that text a meaning that cannot be demonstrated exegetically. What are we to do with these texts? We will survey and analyze the most popular answers to this question in the next section.

V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM

A. THE USE OF JEWISH EXEGETICAL METHODS

The most popular explanation for the way in which the New Testament interprets the Old Testament likens the New Testament approach to that of first-century Judaism. Striking similarities, it is argued, are found between the New Testament use of the Old and the way the rabbis—especially the Qumran community—applied Scripture to their own situations. Some of the peculiar and, to modern eyes, unconvincing interpretations of Old Testament texts in the New Testament are to be seen, then, as examples of a "midrashic" or "pesher" approach such as was popular in the first-century Jewish environment. How should we view this explanation for the problem we are probing?

First, there can be no doubt that the New Testament often utilizes citation techniques that are quite similar to practices amply illustrated in first-century Jewish sources—combining verses on the basis of verbal resemblance (what the rabbis called *gezerah shawah*; cf. Ps 110:1 and 16:8–11 in Ac 2:25–34), argument from the less to the more significant (*qal wahomer*; cf. Jn 7:23), the use of subtle allusions to texts and themes to convey a message (cf. the use of the "lament psalms" in the Crucifixion narratives in the Synoptics especially), the choosing of textual forms that are most conducive to the point being made (e.g., Ac 15:16–18), and many others. Moreover, the New Testament shares with Qumran the conviction that the prophets spoke of their own times and experience. These similarities, and many others that have been amply documented, are undeniable. But what is considerably in doubt is the degree to which such methods

are found and the implications of their use for inspiration and inerrancy. Many think that the New Testament authors have uncritically adopted improper and even fantastic Jewish exegetical methods and that the use of these methods discredits their exegetical conclusions. Beegle, for instance, attributes Matthew's "misuse" of Hosea 11:1, noted above, to his use of Jewish methods.⁵² In response to this kind of criticism and in order to evaluate more accurately the significance of these methods for New Testament interpretation, the following points should be noted.

First, it is vitally important that certain key terms, such as "midrash" and "pesher," be carefully defined, if not in a definitive way, at least for the purposes of the discussion at hand. Thus, for instance, Richard Longenecker finds a considerable amount of "pesher" exegesis in the New Testament; but he appears to understand it broadly to refer to any "direct" application of the Old Testament to the New that proceeds from a revelatory basis.⁵³ Granted that definition, the use of pesher per se in the New Testament need not invalidate the exegetical conclusions thereby reached. Others, however, at least judging by their strictures against it, apparently understand pesher necessarily to involve a "reading into" an Old Testament text of what is not there. Similar problems crop up with regard to the term "midrash."⁵⁴ Without attempting definitions here, we simply point out that not all Jewish exegetical methods, whether they be called "pesher," "midrash," or "midrash pesher," necessarily result in a perversion of the meaning of the text.

A second consideration relates to the problem of cultural subjectivity. Without by any means endorsing the extreme position of those who open the door to complete exegetical relativity by claiming that our cultural context forbids us from finding the "correct" meaning of an ancient text, it is nevertheless important that we exercise humility with respect to our own exegetical method. At the least, we need to recognize that when we criticize rabbinic and Jewish interpretation procedures, we do so from the standpoint of our present understanding of good exegetical method. And it also means that we must consider the soundness of the argument that New Testament authors would not have used some Jewish techniques because they would have been logically unconvincing. They may be logically unconvincing to *us*, but it is not clear that they would have been to their immediate audience.

More importantly, we should recognize that the degree of influence of Jewish exegetical methods on New Testament procedure has often been considerably exaggerated. A vast gulf separates the often fantastic, purely verbal exegeses of the rabbis from the generally sober and clearly contextually oriented interpretations found in the New Testament.⁵⁵ Indeed, it is where Jewish exegesis strays furthest from what we would consider sound principles that the New Testament differs most from it.

A further helpful distinction is that between "appropriation techniques" and "hermeneutical axioms." By the former, I mean those specific, "on the surface" methods by which a text is "appropriated" for a new situation—straightforward identification of one situation or person with another, modification of the text to suit the application, association of several passages, etc. In this the New Testament shows undeniable similarities to the Qumran literature, rabbinic literature, and other early Jewish materials. But lying behind these techniques (and ultimately crucial for how and where they are employed) are the basic convictions of a community about Scripture, its own identity, and the movement of God in history.

For instance, the Qumran community—convinced that it was the people of God, that the last days had arrived, and that the prophets spoke in "riddles" about the last days—directly applied the details of Habakkuk's prophecy to themselves and their enemies. From our standpoint, not convinced of the truth of these, their "hermeneutical axioms," we find their exegesis strained and unconvincing. But from their standpoint, it obviously made perfect sense.

Similarly, New Testament exegesis proceeds on the assumption that Jesus Christ is the culmination of God's plan and that "all the law and the prophets" ultimately point to Him. Behind what may sometimes appear to be a mere verbal resemblance between an Old Testament text and its New Testament "fulfillment" may lie a deepened identification of Jesus with an Old Testament figure. This is not to say that valid exegesis is entirely a product of arbitrary, undemonstrable hermeneutical axioms; some axioms and exegeses provide a much better "fit" with the material itself than others. Rather, the point is that the New Testament can, at the level of appropriation technique, resemble closely contemporary Jewish methods, while below the surface, as it were, basic theological connections between the Testaments are at work, providing the "validating" matrix for what may seem to be an arbitrary exegesis.⁵⁶

Thus far, we have argued that the New Testament use of Jewish exegetical methods does not lead necessarily to the misinterpretation of the Old Testament; nor does it, in itself, constitute a problem for the inspiration and inerrancy of the Scripture. On the other hand, it should be clear that neither does it provide a solution to the problem we are considering. Study of Jewish exegetical procedures may help to explain *what* the New Testament authors sometimes do with Scripture and *why* they do it; and it shows that Jesus and the writers of the New Testament often use methods that would have been familiar and acceptable to many of their contemporaries.

But the presence of first-century exegetical techniques provides no help in answering the question before us: is the meaning discovered by means of these techniques "really in" the Old Testament? Thus, conservatives who stress the presence of Jewish

exegetical techniques in the New Testament often appeal for the validity of the exegesis to the "charismatic" stance of the interpreter. As E. Earle Ellis explains Paul's procedure: "His idea of a quotation was not a worshipping of the letter or 'parroting' of the text; neither was it an eisegesis which arbitrarily imposed a foreign meaning upon the text. It was rather, in his eyes, a quotation-exposition, a *midrash pesher*, which drew from the text the meaning originally implanted there by the Holy Spirit and expressed that meaning in the most appropriate words and phrases known to him."⁵⁷

That the exegesis of the New Testament writers did, in fact, find in the Old Testament the meaning intended by the Spirit can no doubt be asserted on dogmatic grounds; and it may be that we will be left with no alternative but to accept their procedure because of the authority of the New Testament or to reject that authority because of its obvious misinterpretations of the Old Testament. But before casting the issue in terms of such stark alternatives, we should thoroughly explore the theoretical and hermeneutical foundations of the New Testament use of the Old, seeing if we can provide a clearer rationale for the validity and coherence of the biblical authors' practice.

B. TYPOLOGY

In the last thirty years, typology has reemerged, after a period of relative neglect, as one of the most popular ways of explaining the relationship between the Testaments. Typology is set forth by many scholars as the key to understanding the New Testament use of the Old.⁵⁸ Unfortunately, there is widespread disagreement about the definition and extent of typology.

Most would agree with David Baker's simple definition: "a *type* is a biblical event, person or institution which serves as an example or pattern for other events, persons or institutions."⁵⁹ Basic to typology, it is generally agreed, is the belief that God acts in similar ways in both Testaments; hence, there can be a real correspondence between the Old Testament and the New. That typology works from the narratives of God's activity in history is also a matter of general consensus—although whether the type must always be a *historical* figure, event, or institution is debated.⁶⁰ Most scholars also carefully distinguish typology from allegory—on the basis of the strongly historical character of typology and the "real" correspondence that must exist between type and antitype; where allegory looks for meaning *behind* the text, typology bases meaning on the events narrated *in* the text.⁶¹ An eschatological "fullness" or advance (*Steigerung*) in the New Testament antitype over against the Old Testament type is also usually considered essential to true typology.⁶²

Once we move beyond these general characteristics, however, considerable disagreement sets in. Particularly significant for our

purposes is the debate about whether typology is prospective or retrospective. Does the Old Testament type have a genuinely predictive function, or is typology simply a way of looking back at the Old Testament and drawing out resemblances?⁶³ Related to this question is the matter of classifying typology. Is it a general way of viewing the relationship between Old Testament and New (a "*pneumatische Betrachtungsweise*," as Leonhard Goppelt calls it⁶⁴), a system of exegesis, a form of prophecy, or what? A certain circularity of procedure is often evident at this point, as scholars—according to the definition they have established—select what they think are genuine instances of New Testament typology.

Without attempting anything approaching a definitive definition, we suggest that typology is best viewed as a specific form of the larger "promise-fulfillment" scheme that provides the essential framework within which the relationship of the Testaments must be understood. This "salvation-historical" movement from Old to New Testament permeates the thinking of Jesus and the early church and is the ultimate validation for their extensive use of the Old Testament to depict and characterize their own situation.⁶⁵ The two Testaments are bound together by their common witness to the unfolding revelation of God's character, purpose, and plan. But the salvation wrought by God through Christ is the "fulfillment" of Old Testament history, law, and prophecy. This being the case, New Testament persons, events, and institutions will sometimes "fill up" Old Testament persons, events, and institutions by repeating at a deeper or more climactic level that which was true in the original situation.

If we ask whether the typological correspondence was intended in the Old Testament, we would answer differently according to what is meant. If by "intended" is meant that the participants in the Old Testament situation, or the author of the text that records it, were always cognizant of the typological significance, we would respond negatively. But 1 Corinthians 10 suggests that there is some kind of "prospective" element in typological events. In this passage, Paul warns the Corinthians about presuming that the sacraments will shield them from the judgment of God by pointing out that the Israelites also possessed a "baptism" and "spiritual food" but nevertheless suffered the judgment of God. What is significant is that Paul says that these events "*happened*" to the Israelites "as types" (*typikōs*), by which he implies that there was typological significance to the events as they took place.⁶⁶ The "anticipatory" element in these typological experiences may sometimes have been more or less dimly perceived by the participants and human authors; but it is to be ascribed finally to God, who ordered these events in such a way that they would possess a "prophetic" function.

The use of Psalm 22 in the New Testament affords a good example of typological relationship. This psalm, usually categorized

as an "individual lament," figures prominently in the narration of the crucifixion of Jesus. Jesus Himself uses its opening words to convey His sense of abandonment (Mk 15:34/Mt 27:46); John states that the dividing of Jesus' clothes "fulfilled" Psalm 22:18, and all four Evangelists allude to Psalm 22 in their depiction of the Crucifixion.

What is the basis for this significant application of language that appears to have no prospective force to Jesus' passion? Albert Vis finds no basis of any kind: he argues that the early church has arbitrarily and illegitimately applied the psalm to Christ for apologetic reasons.⁶⁷ But, taking David to be the author of the psalm, we must remember that he is much more than an "individual" righteous sufferer. The promises given to him and to his progeny and his status as Israel's king give to many of his psalms a corporate and even eschatological significance.⁶⁸

Some, then, have viewed the psalm as a direct messianic prophecy, but the historical circumstances are too clear to accept this proposal. It has been popular more recently to see the psalm as part of a widespread "righteous sufferer" motif that the Evangelists used to show the innocence of Jesus.⁶⁹ Others see this as an instance of *sensus plenior* (for which, see below).⁷⁰

But it is best to think that the use of the psalm is based on an underlying typological relationship: Jesus is the ultimate "fulfillment" of the experience and feelings that David undergoes in this passage. It is not clear that David would always have been aware of the ultimate significance of his language; but God could have so ordered his experiences and his recordings of them in Scripture that they become anticipatory of the sufferings of "David's greater son." It is this fundamental identification of Christ with David in a typological relationship, not chance verbal similarities, that undergird the extensive use of this psalm.⁷¹

It appears, then, that typology does have a "prospective" element, but the "prospective" nature of specific Old Testament incidents could often be recognized only retrospectively. In some cases, certainly, the Israelites themselves will have recognized the symbolic value of some of their history (e.g., the Exodus) and institutions (the cultus, to some extent). But not all typological correspondence involves recognizable symbols; and the prospective element in many Old Testament types, though intended by God in a general sense, would not have been recognized at the time by the Old Testament authors or the original audience. Without confining valid types to those specifically mentioned in the New Testament, then,⁷² it is nevertheless true that we would not know of some types had the New Testament not revealed them to us and that any types we may suggest lack the authoritative status enjoyed by those singled out by the inspired authors.

That typology offers some help for the problem we are consider-

ing is obvious. What might at first sight appear to be arbitrary applications of Old Testament texts, based on mere verbal analogies or the like, can often be seen to be founded on a deeper, typological structure. On the other hand, it must be admitted that typology will itself be accorded legitimacy only if the basic assumptions on which it is founded are granted—that God had so ordered Old Testament history that it prefigures and anticipates His climactic redemptive acts and that the New Testament is the inspired record of those redemptive acts. An appropriate recognition of the place of typology in New Testament interpretation of the Old is important as providing a structure that gives coherence and legitimacy to many specific applications. On the other hand, however, it leaves unexplained many interpretations that involve an apparently strained interpretation of specific words or where the element of correspondence is not clear. While according to typology the significance it deserves, then, we must look for other explanations of some of the problem texts.

C. ELIMINATION OF THE PROBLEM THROUGH THEOLOGICAL EXEGESIS

Over the last two decades, no one has given more attention to the implications of the use of the Old Testament in the New for inspiration and inerrancy than Walter C. Kaiser, Jr.⁷³ Because of this, and because his approach raises in a particularly insistent form some of the most important questions involved in the problem we are considering, we will devote some space to an analysis of his solution.

From a doctrinal standpoint, he is convinced, it is illegitimate for a New Testament author to find more, or different, *meaning* in an Old Testament text than the original human author himself intended. As he puts it at one point, ". . . the whole revelation of God as revelation hangs in jeopardy if we, an apostle, or an angel from heaven try to add to, delete, rearrange, or reassign the sense or meaning that a prophet himself received."⁷⁴ Kaiser does allow that a New Testament author may draw out some of the implications or applications of an Old Testament text, but this involves *significance*, not meaning. Hermeneutically, Kaiser endorses an "intentionality" theory of meaning, according to which the meaning of any text is tied to what the author of that text intended to say.⁷⁵ This meaning, although potentially embracing more than one concept or application, is nevertheless one: it is wrong, as well as hermeneutically disastrous, to think that a text can have more than one meaning.

Kaiser does not rest with simple dogmatic assertion; he has sought to demonstrate the validity of his approach inductively by tackling over the years some of the knottiest problem quotations in the New Testament. We have noted above his treatment of one such text (1Co 9:9). His approach to the text is typical of his method: careful consideration is given to the context of the Old Testament text cited,

particularly the larger theological context that too many exegetes ignore or fail to see. An illegitimately atomistic exegesis or a narrow, one-sided concern with form-critical questions frequently prevents the exegete from recognizing the "informing theology," the rich tapestry of unfolding theological themes and concepts within the Old Testament that provide the crucial context for many prophecies.⁷⁶ Once sufficient account is taken of this theological context, and the New Testament context is similarly understood in all its theological richness, apparent discrepancies between the meaning of an Old Testament text and the meaning given that text in the New Testament disappear.

Kaiser is to be commended for bringing to our attention the seriousness of the issue. And there is much in his approach that is right on target. Far too many approaches to Old Testament exegesis focus so exclusively on putative stages of tradition and interpret texts so rigidly in terms of hypothetical *Sitze im Leben* that the theological significance of the final product is entirely ignored or obscured. When this happens, it can legitimately be objected that the texts are no longer being given their natural, contextual, *theological* sense, and alleged discrepancies between findings reached by such methods and interpretations found in the New Testament should be accorded little significance. It is no wonder that when such an exegetical procedure is employed, New Testament authors—who read the Old Testament as a single, thoroughly theological book—are found to misinterpret the Old Testament.

Kaiser is also justified in his strictures against the "hermeneutical nihilism" that plagues much modern literary criticism; it is vital that we not surrender the insistence that a text has a single, determinative meaning. And finally, in what is the acid test for any theory, he succeeds in demonstrating that it is capable of explaining several otherwise problematic applications of Old Testament texts.

Several questions, however, have been raised with respect to this proposal. Some have criticized Kaiser for committing the "intentional fallacy," but this criticism is wide of the mark.⁷⁷ More serious is the criticism that he does not allow sufficiently for the intention of the divine author of Scripture or for the "added" meaning that a text takes on as a result of the ongoing canonical process. We will deal with both these issues below; here we will simply note that it is not so certain that meaning should be confined to the intention of the human author of Scripture.

What is ultimately crucial is the question whether the approach advocated by Kaiser can solve every "problem text" with which we are confronted in the New Testament use of the Old. The success of Kaiser's approach depends on the extent and nature of the "informing theology" that he claims as the undergirding context of many texts. While many Old Testament exegetes undoubtedly accept far too

little by way of overarching theological constructs, it may be that Kaiser on occasion finds more than is clearly supported by the text. For example, in dealing with the quotation of Hosea 11:1 in Matthew 2:15, Kaiser argues that the key to the legitimacy of Matthew's interpretation is the fact that Hosea "no doubt understood the technical nature of 'my son' along with its implications for corporate solidarity."⁷⁸ But what is the evidence that Hosea intended this in his use of "son" here? He never elsewhere uses the word in a theological sense; nor is there a great deal of evidence that *ben* is a corporate concept in the Old Testament.

Another crucial issue is whether we can speak of "meaning" or "significance" in Old Testament texts as they are cited in the New Testament. If the latter, the New Testament application need not, according to Kaiser, be clearly present in the original author's intention; if the former, then it must be. In the case of the use of Deuteronomy 25:4 in 1 Corinthians 9:9, for instance, the *meaning* of the Old Testament text is the principle that workers (whether animal or human) deserve to be rewarded. Paul's application of the principle, then, to Christian ministers validly draws out the *significance* of that text.

But there are other texts where the distinction is not so neat and where the New Testament author appears to assign more, or different, "meaning" to an Old Testament text than can legitimately be inferred as being part of the human author's intention. A series of texts in which this seems to be the case are those in which Old Testament passages describing God or Yahweh are applied to Jesus in the New Testament. Romans 10:13, for instance, applies to faith in Jesus the words of Joel 2:32 (MT; LXX 3:5): "Everyone who calls on the name of the Lord will be saved." There is no evidence, either from Joel or from an "antecedent theology," that the prophet would have intended his words to refer to Christ. From the standpoint of the revelation of the nature of Jesus in the New Testament, of course, we can understand the legitimacy of applying Old Testament passages about God to Christ. Now perhaps Kaiser would regard this as an instance in which a New Testament author perceives further significance in the Joel text. But it seems to me that this kind of procedure goes beyond the drawing out of the significance of the text; the meaning of the word Yahweh (= LXX *kyrios*) is being expanded and, implicitly, more precisely defined by Paul.

A similar situation seems to exist in the application to Jesus of texts such as Psalm 2:7 ("You are my son, today I have begotten you" RSV) or 2 Samuel 7:14 ("I will be his father, and he will be my son"). Granted that there is behind both texts the concept of the Davidic King and his descendants as the heirs to the promise, it is nevertheless the case that the meaning of the word "son" is distinctly different when applied to David or Solomon than when applied to Jesus.

Therefore, while remaining extremely sympathetic to Kaiser's general approach, and, in fact, strongly supporting much of what he says, I am not convinced that his approach offers an ultimately satisfactory answer to all the problems raised by the use of the Old Testament in the New. There are places where the New Testament attributes to Old Testament texts more meaning than it can be legitimately inferred the human author was aware of. Nor do I think it is fatal to the doctrines of inspiration or inerrancy to suggest this. Only if the meaning of Old Testament texts *must* be confined to what we can prove their human authors intended does such a problem arise. Therefore, we will now look at some proposals that look beyond the original human author for a solution to these problem quotations.

D. SENSUS PLENIOR

Sensus Plenior, "fuller sense," is a phrase that was first coined by Catholic scholars, who have subjected the concept to thorough analysis and debate. But the concept denoted by the phrase—and often the phrase itself—is also popular among Protestants. Although precise definitions of the idea may differ, we will use it to designate the idea that there is in many scriptural texts a "fuller sense" than that consciously intended by the human author—a sense intended by God, the ultimate author of Scripture. It is this meaning, an integral part of the text, that is discerned and used by later interpreters who appear to find "new" meaning in Old Testament texts. This "new" meaning is, then, part of the author's intention—the divine author and not necessarily the human author.

Raymond Brown, whose monograph is the most important statement and defense of the approach, describes *sensus plenior* as "that additional deeper meaning, intended by God but not clearly intended by the human author, which is seen to exist in the words of a biblical text (or group of texts, or even a whole book) when they are studied in the light of further revelation or development in the understanding of revelation."⁷⁹ Several elements of this definition must be further explained if we are to understand the nature of this proposal.

First, Brown insists that the *sensus plenior*—though by definition involving a meaning not fully understood by the human author—could, nevertheless, have been dimly perceived by him at times. As he puts it, the human author's awareness of the *sensus plenior* could range "from absolute ignorance to near clarity."⁸⁰ Generally, however, *sensus plenior* is used to refer to a meaning that cannot be demonstrated by means of traditional grammatical-historical exegesis. Second, there must be a relation between the literal sense intended by the human author and the "fuller" sense intended by God.⁸¹ Advocates of the approach insist on this control lest the concept be used as an excuse for uncontrolled allegorizing.

Third, the *sensus plenior* is to be distinguished from typology; the former has to do with the deeper meaning of *words*, the latter with the extended meaning of *things*.⁸² The bronze serpent in the wilderness may be considered a "type" of Christ on the cross, but the application to Christ of Psalm 2:7 ("you are my son") involves a "deeper sense" of the words themselves. Fourth, the *sensus plenior* is also to be distinguished from what Roman Catholic scholars have called "accommodation," the application of a biblical text to a situation not envisaged in the text itself. ("Accommodation" in this sense is to be distinguished from "accommodation" as used with respect to God's adapting Himself to human words in the process of revelation.) Brown argues for the need of the *sensus plenior* approach by pointing to the inadequacy of "accommodation" to handle the data: "[The New Testament writers] certainly give no evidence that they are using the Scriptures in a sense not intended by God (accommodation); on the contrary, they make it clear that their spiritual meaning is precisely that meaning intended by God, but not realized by the Jews."⁸³

Fifth, as the quotation above specifies, a valid *sensus plenior* can be adduced only on the basis of "revelation" or "further development in revelation." For Brown and other Roman Catholics, this authority includes the church (the "magisterium") and the New Testament.⁸⁴ The *sensus plenior* becomes very important, then, for Roman Catholics, in that it provides a way to justify through Scripture the development of Mariology and other such otherwise poorly supported theological concepts. But, as we suggested earlier, the *sensus plenior* approach is also very popular among Protestants—who, naturally, confine the "further revelation" on which a fuller sense can authoritatively be based to the New Testament.⁸⁵

What are we to make of this proposal? Many object to the notion because the lack of objective controls renders it liable to abuse. On what basis does one decide what the Spirit might be saying through the words of a text?⁸⁶ Some respond that only those "deeper meanings" specifically enumerated in the New Testament should be accepted. But whether this restriction be accepted or not, it is a well-known logical principle that difficulties created by a theory are never sufficient to falsify that theory, if it is well-enough established on other grounds. If *sensus plenior* be demonstrated to be a viable concept, we will simply have to live with the difficulties, much as we live with the difficulties inherent in a teleological view of world history.

A second objection to the idea of a *sensus plenior* holds that the New Testament authors would not have appealed to a "hidden" meaning in the text, because this would have evaporated any apologetic value from the appeal. Would sceptical Jews be likely to accept the claims of the early church if they were based on

unprovable assertions about what the Old Testament "really" meant? This objection has some point, but its force is mitigated by two considerations. First, we must be careful not to think that methods of proof not convincing to us would necessarily have been equally unconvincing to first-century Jews. The use of Scripture both at Qumran and by the rabbis gives little evidence that modern notions of biblical argument were considered important among ancient Jews. Second, we must ask to what extent the New Testament appeal to Scripture is intended for "general" consumption or with apologetic purpose. Much, if not most, of the use of the Old Testament in the New is designed to assure or convince Christians, for whom the general relevance of the Old Testament for the church was already assumed.⁸⁷

Since no biblical text clearly teaches the concept and no biblical text clearly refutes it,⁸⁸ our final acceptance or rejection of the idea will depend on whether it is necessary and adequate to explain the phenomena and whether it coheres with an acceptable theory of inspiration. It is with respect to this second point that the most serious objection to the theory is raised. Inspiration, as we noted earlier, is generally conceived to be a "concurrent" phenomenon whereby God so uses the human author that the final product, Scripture, is definitely and uniquely *God's Word* and, at the same time, the culturally, historically, linguistically conditioned words of human beings. If this is so, it is argued, the notion that God has placed in Scripture a meaning unknown to the human author (the "instrument" by which God produced Scripture) is inconsistent with inspiration. Whatever it is, then, this "fuller meaning" cannot be part of the *text*, since the meaning of that text is limited to what the divine/*human* author intended.⁸⁹ There is validity to this objection. A notion of inspiration that "divides" the divine and human authors of Scripture may be theologically as suspect as a Christology that too rigidly separates the divine and human natures of Christ.

However, this objection is not decisive. Brown, replying to such criticism, argues that the "instrumentality" of the human author of Scripture cannot be taken in the rigid, technical sense implied by some statements of the problem. As long as God uses that "instrument" (the human author) according to its "proper sphere" (viz., cognition and intention) and the human author always is really an instrument (in the sense that the "literal" sense is always present and not excluded by the "fuller" sense), then it is neither impossible nor objectionable to think that God could ". . . elevate that instrument to produce an additional effect outside the sphere of its proper activity." Brown goes on to quote Manuel de Tuya: "From the fact that God is using an instrument which is *capable of knowledge*, it does not follow that God can use this intelligent instrument only in as much as he actually knows all that God wanted to express."⁹⁰ While not strictly

parallel, since the production of inspired Scripture is not involved, the example of the "prophecy" of Caiaphas (Jn 11:49–52) is suggestive: as "high priest that year," he communicated a message from God that goes beyond anything he consciously intended.

Walter Kaiser objects, "Could God see or intend a sense in a particular text *separate* and *different* from that conceived and intended by his human instrument?"⁹¹ But this is to erect a wider chasm between the "literal" and the "fuller" sense than advocates of a *sensus plenior* conceive. Brown insists that the *sensus plenior* be "homogeneous" with the literal sense,⁹² and J. I. Packer, defending a limited "fuller sense," insists that this further meaning ". . . is simple extension, development, and application of what the writer was consciously expressing."⁹³ The question should rather be: Could God have intended a sense *related to* but *more than* that which the human author intended? I cannot see that the doctrine of inspiration demands that the answer to that question be negative.

It is not clear, then, that the usual objections brought against the idea of a *sensus plenior* are cogent. There does not appear to be any compelling reason for rejecting the hypothesis. On the other hand, there are reasons to hesitate before embracing it as a comprehensive explanation of the "problem" uses of the Old Testament in the New. For one thing, the New Testament sometimes appeals to the *human* author of the Old Testament text for what appears to be a questionable application. For instance, Peter specifically states that *David* spoke about the resurrection of the Messiah in Psalm 16 (Ac 2:25–28). Yet few scholars find any evidence in the text of that psalm that David had anyone but himself in mind as he wrote it.⁹⁴ Moreover, the New Testament generally gives the impression that the meaning they find in the Old Testament can be seen by others, too, once certain basic presuppositions are granted (see Jn 3:10; Mk 12:26). Yet if Jesus and the New Testament authors are appealing to a "hidden" sense of the text, revealed only by the Spirit to them, such an argument is nonsensical. Therefore, without at this point excluding the possibility that a *sensus plenior* may be the best explanation for some of the problematic quotations, we are encouraged by these remaining difficulties to investigate other possible approaches first.

E. A CANONICAL APPROACH

A renewed interest in the final, canonical form of the Old Testament and its significance for exegesis and interpretation has been a hallmark of recent Old Testament studies. Many scholars, who for various reasons find themselves unable to accept the *sensus plenior* approach in its usual form, have focused on the ultimate canonical context of any single scriptural text as the basis on which to find a "fuller" sense in that text than its human author may have been cognizant of. Norbert Lohfink, for instance, suggests that the need to

posit a *sensus plenior* is largely due to the unnecessarily stringent restriction of the "literal sense" to what can be discovered through historical-grammatical exegesis. Instead, he argues, one should posit a "'theological' literal sense," which "means nothing other than the meaning of the scripture read as a whole and in the *analogia fidei*."⁹⁵

Without calling this further meaning the "'theological' literal sense"—a designation of questionable appropriateness, since it is liable to confusion with the human author's conscious intention, often "theological" in nature—a number of other scholars have advocated a similar proposal.⁹⁶ Common to them is the argument that any specific biblical text can legitimately be interpreted in light of its ultimate literary context—the whole canon, which receives its unity from the single divine author of the whole. The original human author may often have had an inkling that his words were pregnant with meaning he himself did not yet understand, but he would not have been in a position to see the entire context of his words; some biblical books written before him may not have been available to him, and, of course, he was unaware of the revelation that would be given after his time.

This way of looking at the phenomenon of the use of the Old Testament in the New has much to commend it. First, it builds on the scripturally sound basis of a redemptive-historical framework, in which the Old Testament as a whole points forward to, anticipates, and prefigures Christ and the church: "all the law and the prophets prophesied until John" (Mt 11:13 RSV); "Christ is the *telos* [goal and end] of the law" (Ro 10:4). These texts and others show that the New Testament views the Old Testament as a collection of books that, in each of its parts and in its whole, was somehow "incomplete" until "filled up" through the advent of Christ and the inauguration of the era of salvation. Jesus "fills up" Israel's law (Mt 5:17), her history (Mt 2:15), and her prophecy (Ac 3:18). That He might also "fill up" the meaning of many specific Old Testament texts would not be at all incommensurate with this characteristic pattern.

Second, this scheme can be shown to have its antecedents in what the Old Testament itself does with earlier revelation. Outstanding events like the Exodus take on more and more significance as they are used to model the future dealings of God with His people.⁹⁷ The significance of Israel's Davidic king as an anticipation of the messianic king becomes clearer and more specific as the Old Testament unfolds. The "meaning" of the choice of David to be king of Israel becomes deeper in the light of further Old Testament revelation, going beyond what would have been recognized by David's contemporaries, by Samuel, or even by David himself. And not until the greater son of David himself appears on the scene does this meaning reach its deepest level.

Third, the questionable division between the intention of the

human author and that of the divine author in a given text is decreased, if not avoided altogether, in this approach. Appeal is made not to a meaning of the divine author that somehow is deliberately concealed from the human author in the process of inspiration—a “*sensus occultus*”—but to the meaning of the text itself that takes on deeper significance as God’s plan unfolds—a “*sensus praegnans*.” To be sure, God knows, as He inspires the human authors to write, what the ultimate meaning of their words will be; but it is not as if He has deliberately created a *double entendre* or hidden a meaning in the words that can only be uncovered through a special revelation. The “added meaning” that the text takes on is the product of the ultimate canonical shape—though, to be sure, often clearly perceived only on a revelatory basis.

And this means, fourthly, that the “fuller sense” discovered by Jesus and the apostles in Old Testament texts is, at least to some extent, open to verification. One can, by reading the Old Testament in the light of its completion and as a whole, as they did, often demonstrate the validity of the added meaning they find in texts. But this must also be qualified. It is no doubt true, though the point is often exaggerated, that Jesus and the apostles did not always work by conscious hermeneutical principles in their application of Old Testament texts. The revelatory stance of the New Testament interpreters of the Old must not be ignored; and some of the applications they make would never have been discovered if they had not told us of them. Who would have guessed, for instance, that Rachel’s weeping for her children (Jer 31:15) would have been “filled up” in the weeping of the people of Bethlehem over their slaughtered infants (Mt 2:17–18)? The specificity of the application could not have been made without the benefit of revelation. On the other hand, it needs to be stressed again that the “fulfillment” of this Old Testament text does not imply that Matthew views it as a *prophecy*; and the context of Jeremiah shows how appropriate and theologically profound Matthew’s application of this text is.⁹⁸

In the debate over whether we can “reproduce the exegesis of the New Testament,” then, our answer must be carefully nuanced. On the one hand, we do not have the same revelatory authority to make the specific identifications made in the New Testament. But, on the other hand, we can usually see the theological structure and hermeneutical principles on which the New Testament interpretation of the Old rests; and we can follow the New Testament in applying similar criteria in our own interpretation.⁹⁹

The nature and usefulness of this approach can be better appreciated if we apply it to some specific examples. We will look at two Old Testament texts, one from the Psalms and the other from the Prophets, whose extension of meaning in the New Testament is best explained as due to deepening of meaning through further revelation.

In 1 Corinthians 15:27, Paul quotes Psalm 8:6 ("God has put all things in subjection under his feet" *RSV*) as proof that Christ's reign must culminate in His sovereignty over everything, even death itself (v 26). Unlike both the MT and the LXX, Paul's citation uses the third person singular verb rather than the second person, but this modification—being necessary to fit the verse into Paul's context—does not really affect the meaning. Psalm 8 praises God's majesty and expresses awe at the dignity and supremacy to which God had raised insignificant mankind. The "man" of the psalm is clearly the generic or representative man, particularly in his original created state.

What right, then, does Paul have to take language from the psalm and apply it to Christ? One possible response is that Paul does not really "quote" from the psalm but simply uses the language of the psalm to make his point (cf. our discussion about Old Testament language as a "vehicle of expression" above).¹⁰⁰ But although Paul does not use a formula to introduce the quotation, the significance of the appeal in its context suggests that he is adducing proof from an outside source. Others, then, consider this a case of *sensus plenior*: Paul, from his inspired standpoint, discerns in the verse the meaning that God had ultimately intended in it.¹⁰¹ In the nature of the case, this possibility cannot be excluded, but other options should be explored first.

Since Psalm 8:4 uses the phrase "son of man," it has been suggested that an implicit Son of Man christology lies behind the use of Psalm 8 both here and in Hebrews 2.¹⁰² Paul's application would then be validated by virtue of a typological or even prophetic understanding of Psalm 8. But Paul's failure to use an explicit "Son of Man" christology makes this suggestion questionable. A better approach is to recognize the significance of the Adam-Christ comparison in Paul's theology—specifically in 1 Corinthians 15. Paul sees Christ as the "second Adam," the "spiritual," "heavenly," eschatological Adam (1Co 15:45–47).¹⁰³ Christ, then, is both "like" Adam in his significance as "representative head" and different from Adam in origin, nature, and impact on humanity (cf. also Ro 5:12–21). In some sense, then, Paul views Christ as "perfect" man—the ideal not realized by Adam but now embodied in the "last Adam." Granted this perception of Christ, we can see how Paul would naturally attribute language about the "ideal man" to Christ. The psalm itself gives no indication that anything other than man in his ideal, created state is in view; but, in the light of New Testament revelation, it can now be seen that none other than Christ fulfills this role of the ideal man. Paul's use of this psalm, therefore, receives its validation from the legitimacy of regarding Christ as ideal man.¹⁰⁴ His is not an appeal to a meaning deliberately hidden in the text by God but to the meaning that that text can now be seen to have in the light of the significance of Christ.

No Old Testament text is more significant for Paul than Habakkuk 2:4b: "the righteous will live by his faith." It is cited in both Romans (1:17) and Galatians (3:11) as substantiation for Paul's crucial doctrine of justification by faith. The textual situation is complicated and debated. The MT adds after "faith" (*'ēmūnâ*), the third person singular pronominal suffix ("his")—almost certainly referring to the "righteous one" (*ṣadīq*).¹⁰⁵ In the LXX, however, the first person singular possessive occurs (*pisteōs mou*, "my faith"), a reference, it seems, to the faith, or "faithfulness," of God.¹⁰⁶

Paul's omission of any possessive is probably deliberate and has been variously explained. Some have suggested that Paul in Galatians 3:11 intends a reference to God's faithfulness rather than to man's faith, but this is unlikely.¹⁰⁷ It is more likely that Paul omits the qualifier to highlight his notion of faith as something "*extra nos*"—the gift of God, not a possession or quality of man.¹⁰⁸ Here, then, is a case in which a modification in the text effects a certain nuance of meaning. A further preliminary issue is the strongly contested issue of what Paul intends the prepositional phrase *ek pisteōs* to modify. Is he stressing that "the one who is righteous will live by faith" (taking *ek pisteōs* with *zēsetai*)¹⁰⁹ or that "the one who is righteous by faith will live" (taking *ek pisteōs* with *dikaioi*)?¹¹⁰ Certainty is impossible, but the emphasis on righteousness in both Romans and Galatians favors the second translation.

What can be said, then, about Paul's hermeneutical procedure in using this text to support his teaching of justification by faith? It is true that each of the three key terms in the quotation has a specific theological nuance derived from Paul's distinctive theology.¹¹¹ For Paul, the one who is "righteous" is the one who has experienced the eschatological gift of Christ (not one who is "right" according to the standard of the law), "faith" takes on all the richness of Paul's characteristic, dynamic understanding, and "life" denotes eternal life.

However, the difference between Paul's use of these terms and their meaning in Habakkuk should not be exaggerated. In Habakkuk, the verse comes as God's answer to the prophet's complaint about the judgment to be visited upon Israel through the wicked "Chaldeans." The term *ṣadīq* means not simply those who are "morally upright" but, as often in the Old Testament, those who belong to God's covenant.¹¹² "Live" (*yih'yê*), to be sure, does not mean "eternal life," but neither does it mean no more than "exist"; the word connotes "life before God," the enjoyment of His covenant grace and blessings.¹¹³ And *'ēmūnâ* means a firm, settled trust in God that rises above the circumstances.¹¹⁴ Thus, while there is no doubt that Paul gives to each of the terms a specific nuance that the original did not have, his interpretation preserves the essential thrust of Habakkuk's meaning—far different from the way the verse was used at Qumran and in some rabbinic texts, where keeping the law was brought into the situation.¹¹⁵

Once again, then, we find an Old Testament verse that is given an added depth, a new richness, a more precise significance in the light of the "revelation of the righteousness of God" (Ro 3:21).¹¹⁶ That God foresaw this added dimension to His words through the prophet is obvious. But there is no evidence that Paul has cited the verse on the basis of a hidden meaning in the text. It is the further revelation of God that brings out from Habakkuk's great principle its ultimate meaning.

The use of the Old Testament in the New cannot be understood without setting it in the framework of the canon as witness to salvation history. This "canonical approach"—to be distinguished from the more specific and far-reaching concept advocated by Brevard S. Childs and others—is an essential and basic element in the answer to the problem we are considering.

But is it able to explain all the problems? R. E. Brown compares this kind of approach unfavorably to the *sensus plenior* explanation because, he claims, the New Testament authors are clear in ascribing the "added meaning" they find to the actual *text* they cite, not to a new appreciation for the place of that text in the history of redemption.¹¹⁷ It was *David*, as we noted earlier, who "foresaw and spoke of the resurrection of the Christ" in Psalm 16 (Ac 2:31 RSV).

In this case, however, Brown's *sensus plenior* solution fares no better, since the meaning is directly ascribed to the human, not the divine, author. What is apparently happening here is not that Psalm 16 takes on added meaning in the light of further revelation but that further revelation enables us to understand for the first time the ultimate significance of David's words. And, in the case of Caiaphas, a still different situation seems to obtain: while John's recognition of the ironically prophetic significance of the high priest's words came long after the fact, on the basis of further revelation, he nevertheless implies that the words, at the time of their utterance, possessed a meaning unknown to Caiaphas. Here, perhaps, we come closest to a genuine *sensus plenior*, although we must keep in mind that Caiaphas is not an author of Scripture.

VI. CONCLUSION

These examples, and others like them, suggest that our explanation of instances where the New Testament finds meaning in Old Testament texts that cannot be demonstrated through normal exegetical procedure cannot be reduced to a single formula. The ultimate canonical context of all of Scripture is the basic starting point and is the ultimate validation of the New Testament approach. From this basic conviction, however, Jesus and the apostles appear to proceed in several different ways. Perhaps most frequent are occa-

sions when later revelation provides the basis to draw out further meaning from the text—meaning not clearly envisaged by the human author but compatible with his intent. Typology is best viewed as a special form of this relationship. In other instances, the brute facts of who Jesus is and what He did, combined with the inspired authors' unique revelatory stance, serve to give them a knowledge of the meaning of the text that would otherwise not have been possible (e.g., Ps 16 in Ac 2). And, finally, it may be that some citations are best explained according to the traditional *sensus plenior* model: by direct, inspired apprehension, the New Testament authors perceive the meaning in a text put there by God but unknown to the human author. Even in this case, however, it is important to insist that this "deeper meaning" is based on and compatible with the meaning intended by the human author. And, while there is some truth to the assertion that the New Testament practice of interpreting the Old Testament should inform our own interpretation, we should be very cautious about suggesting "deeper meanings" in the text that are not clearly enunciated within Scripture.

We have now reached the end of our analysis of popular approaches to the problem of the Old Testament in the New. We have seen that many apparently "new" meanings discovered in Old Testament texts by New Testament authors are no more than the literal sense of those passages when read against the "informing" theology that precedes them.

Not all New Testament citations can be satisfactorily explained by this method, however. There remain some that actually do give to Old Testament texts meanings that do not correspond to the "grammatical-historical" meaning of the text, even when the "informing theology" is fully taken into account. When this happens, it is best to think that the New Testament authors have read the text against the background of the whole scope of revelation, preserved in the developing canon. The meaning intended by the human author of a particular text can take on a "fuller" meaning, legitimately developed from his meaning, in the light of the text's ultimate canonical context. Without necessarily appealing to the divine author as intending a meaning separate from, and hidden from, the human author at the point of inspiration, we would appeal to the divine author as providing the larger context of the developing canon as the framework within which the New Testament writers read the Old Testament. What is involved is not just the ultimate significance of a text, or its valid manifold applications, but the meaning of the text, not fully understood by the human author.

While advancing this viewpoint as the most important for understanding the New Testament use of the Old, we have admitted that not all of the "problem texts" can be satisfactorily fit into this approach. Acts 2 makes clear that the prophecy of the resurrection

that Peter finds in Psalm 16 was David's intended meaning—a specificity of meaning that cannot be demonstrated from exegesis of the psalm. Here Peter is operating on a revelatory basis that is not open to proof or disproof. All that we can show is that the meaning Peter finds is not incommensurate with the original purpose and language of the psalm; but whether we think his interpretation is correct will depend on whether we consider him to be an inspired, accurate interpreter of the Old Testament.

In other words, when dealing with the problem before us, we must forthrightly admit that we cannot *prove* that the New Testament interpretation of the Old Testament is correct at every point. We can show that many are straightforward, legitimate interpretations and that many others can be considered valid if we admit the principle of the canon as the ultimate context of meaning. In other cases, while arguing that the meaning found by the New Testament author does not *violate* the meaning of the original, we will be unable to show how or why they arrived at the meaning they did—we will have to take them by faith, in the best sense of the word.

Does this admission mean that the phenomenon we have considered stands as an argument against inerrancy? We would answer no. For it to be considered as evidence against inerrancy, we would have to be able to show that Jesus or a New Testament author attributes meaning to an Old Testament text that appears to be entirely unrelated to the evident meaning of that text. Does this ever occur? To answer that question, we would have to conduct a thorough inductive study of every use of the Old Testament in the New. But what can be said is that the principles enumerated in this essay—allowing for the hermeneutical axioms of the interpreter, considering the larger theological framework of specific texts, recognizing the validity of the developing canonical context—suffice to explain any “problem text” of which I am aware.¹¹⁸ The “ultimate,” christological meaning discerned by New Testament authors in passage after passage of the Old Testament often extends beyond, but is always based on the meaning intended by the human author.

see N. G. L. Hammond, *Three Historians of Alexander the Great* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

¹⁷⁴For a convenient introduction to this material, see R. L. Fox, *The Search for Alexander* (Boston: Little, 1980): 38–46.

¹⁷⁵On the twenty-plus primary sources for Arrian and Plutarch no longer extant, see especially L. Pearson, *The Lost Histories of Alexander the Great* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1960).

¹⁷⁶A. Wardman, *Plutarch's Lives* (London: Paul Elek, 1974), 161.

¹⁷⁷J. R. Hamilton, *Plutarch, Alexander: A Commentary* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1969), xlv.

¹⁷⁸A. B. Bosworth, *A Historical Commentary on Arrian's History of Alexander* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1980), 1:38–99.

¹⁷⁹*Arrian*, 1:35.

¹⁸⁰Hamilton, *Plutarch*, 32.

¹⁸¹*Arrian*, trans. E. I. Robson, 2 vols. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1929), 1:449–50.

¹⁸²J. G. Lloyd, *Alexander the Great: Selections from Arrian* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 58.

¹⁸³Bosworth, *Arrian's History*, 18.

¹⁸⁴Cf. M. Hengel, *Acts and the History of Earliest Christianity* (London: SCM, 1979), on the practices of ancient historians most relevant to the study of Acts and the Gospels.

¹⁸⁵Hamilton, *Plutarch*, xl.

¹⁸⁶Bosworth, *Arrian's History*, 256; Hamilton, *Plutarch*, 77.

¹⁸⁷*Ibid.*, 83.

¹⁸⁸P. A. Stadter, *Arrian of Nicomedia* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980), 99–100.

¹⁸⁹A. Momigliano, "Biblical Studies and Classical Studies: Simple Reflections about Historical Method," *BA* 45 (1982): 224.

¹⁹⁰*Ibid.*, 225. For a masterful critique of the revisionism rampant among contemporary historians, see O. Handlin, *Truth in History* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979).

CHAPTER FIVE

THE PROBLEM OF SENSUS PLENIOR

Douglas J. Moo

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¹Robert H. Gundry, *Matthew: A Commentary on His Literary and Theological Art* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1982), 623–40. For critical reviews of Gundry's book, see D. A. Carson, "Gundry on Matthew: A Critical Review," *TJ* 3 (1982): 71–91; Philip Barton Payne, "Midrash and History in the Gospels with Special Reference to R. H. Gundry's *Matthew*," *Gospel Perspectives: Studies of History and Tradition in the Four Gospels*, vol. 3, *Studies in Midrash and History*, ed. R. T. France and David Wenham (Sheffield: JSOT, 1983), 177–215; Douglas Moo, "Matthew and Midrash: An Evaluation of Robert H. Gundry's Approach," *JETS* 26 (1983): 31–39.

²William J. Abraham, *The Divine Inspiration of Holy Scripture* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 29.

³B. B. Warfield, *The Inspiration and Authority of the Bible* (reprint, Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1948), 201–26.

⁴See the brief discussion in Paul D. Feinberg, "The Meaning of Inerrancy," *Inerrancy*, ed. Norman L. Geisler (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1979), 270–76.

⁵Though dated now, the article of Moody Smith is still a valuable survey of the field ("The Use of the Old Testament in the New," *The Use of the Old Testament and Other Essays: Studies in Honor of William Franklin Stinespring*, ed. James M. Efird [Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1972]). The most important monographs are: Leonhard Goppelt, *Typos. Die typologische Deutung des Alten Testaments im Neuen* (Gütersloh: Bertelmann, 1939) [now available in English (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1982)]; C. H. Dodd, *According to the Scriptures: The Substructure of New Testament Theology* (London: Collins, 1952); Krister Stendahl, *The School of St. Matthew and Its Use of the Old Testament* (Lund: Gleerup, 1954); Barnabas Lindars, *New Testament Apologetic: The Doctrinal Significance of the Old Testament Quotations* (London: SCM, 1961); E. Earle Ellis, *Paul's Use of the Old Testament* (Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd, 1957); Robert H. Gundry, *The Use of the Old Testament in St. Matthew's Gospel* (Leiden: Brill, 1967); J. W. Dowe, *Jewish Hermeneutics in the Synoptic Gospels and Acts* (Assen: van Gorcum, 1954); Alfred Suhl, *Die Funktion der alttestamentlichen Zitate und Anspielungen im Markusevangelium* (Gütersloh: Mohn, 1965); Friedrich Schröger, *Der Verfasser des Hebräerbriefes als Schriftausleger* (Biblische Untersuchungen 4; Regensburg: Pustet, 1968); Martin Rese, *Alttestamentliche Motive in der Christologie des Lukas* (SNT 1; Gütersloh: Mohn, 1969); W. Rothfuchs, *Die Erfüllungszitate des Matthäus-Evangeliums: eine biblische-theologische Untersuchung* (BWANT 5:8; Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1969); R. T. France, *Jesus and the Old Testament* (London: Tyndale, 1971); Richard N. Longenecker, *Biblical Exegesis in the Apostolic Period* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1975).

⁶Paul J. Achtemeier, *The Inspiration of Scripture: Problems and Proposals* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1980), 64–65, 86–95, 112–13, 130; cf. the more negative assessment of S. Vernon McCasland, "Matthew Twists the Scripture," *JBL* 80 (1961): 143–48.

⁷See especially Origen's discussion in *De Principiis* 4; and cf. Jean Daniélou, *Origen* (New York: Sheed & Warner, 1959), 139–73.

⁸Henri de Lubac, *The Sources of Revelation* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1968), 49. The name to be given to this "sense beyond the literal"—typology, allegory, spiritual sense, mystical sense—and the different nuances within the sense are debated. See the helpful discussion of Glenn W. Olsen, "Allegory, Typology, and the *sensus spiritualis*. Part I: Definition and Earliest History," *Communio* 4 (1977): 161–79.

⁹See the Prologue to the Psalms by Diodore of Tarsus (translation in Karlfried Froelich, *Biblical Interpretation in the Early Church* [Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984], 82–86). On the Antiochians' Old Testament interpretation, see also A. Vicari, "La θεωρία nella scuola esegetica di Antiochia," *Bib* 1 (1920): 3–36.

¹⁰Geoffrey W. Bromiley, "The Church Fathers and Holy Scripture," *Scripture and Truth* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1983), 214.

¹¹John Cassian (d. 435) speaks of these four senses; Rabanus Maurus (d. 856) solidified the "fourfold sense" as authoritative. See Peter Stuhlmacher, *Vom Verstehen des Neuen Testaments. Eine Hermeneutik* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1979), 83; and the massive study of Henri de Lubac, *Exégèse Médiévale. Les Quatre Sens de l'écriture*, 4 vols. (Paris: Aubier, 1959).

¹²See, for this motivation in Origen, Daniélou, *Origen*, 140–43.

¹³Beryl Smalley, *The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1964), 364–65; see also James Samuel Preus (*From Shadow to Promise: Old Testament Interpretation from Augustine to the Young Luther* [Cambridge: Belknap, 1969], 49–107), who surveys some of the medieval controversies over the meaning of the "literal" sense and its difference from the "spiritual" sense.

¹⁴Aquinas specifically ascribes the literal sense to what the author intends; and since the author is God, the literal sense of the text may have many meanings. See *Summa Theologiae* Ia. I, 10; and Smalley, *Study of the Bible*, 300.

- ¹⁵Preus, *From Shadow to Promise*, 106–7.
- ¹⁶*From Shadow to Promise*.
- ¹⁷Heinrich Bornkamm, *Luther and the Old Testament* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1969), 96; cf. 87–101.
- ¹⁸Goppelt, *Typos*, 6–7 (ET).
- ¹⁹See Richard M. Davidson, *Typology in Scripture: A Study of Hermeneutical Τύπος Structures* (Andrews University Doctoral Diss. Series 2; Berrien Springs, Mich.: Andrews University Press, 1981), 33–36.
- ²⁰See the essay by John W. Woodbridge (pp. 237–70 in this volume) for the degree to which these kinds of problems were already being discussed before the popularity of the “grammatical-historical” method.
- ²¹Stuhlmacher, *Vom Verstehen des Neuen Testaments*, 124; G. W. H. Lampe and K. J. Woollcombe, *Essays on Typology* (London: SCM, 1957), 15.
- ²²*Weissagung und Erfüllung im Alten und Neuen Testamente* (Nordlingen: C. H. Beck, 1841–44). See the discussion in Goppelt, *Typos*, 11–13; D. L. Baker, *Two Testaments: One Bible* (Leicester: InterVarsity, 1976), 299–300.
- ²³Ernst Wilhelm Henstenberg, *The Christology of the Old Testament*, 2d ed. (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1854–58).
- ²⁴Patrick Fairbairn, *The Typology of Scripture*, 2 vols. (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1876). Roger R. Nicole has recently advocated Fairbairn’s approach as a way out of the difficulties Evangelicals find themselves in with respect to the use of the Old Testament in the New (“Patrick Fairbairn and Biblical Hermeneutics as Related to the Quotation of the Old Testament in the New,” *Hermeneutics, Inerrancy, and the Bible*, ed. Earl D. Radmacher and Robert D. Preus [Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1984], 767–76).
- ²⁵John H. Newman, *An Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine* (Westminster, Md.: Christian Classics, 1983), 74; cf. Nicholas Lash, *Newman on Development: The Search for an Explanation in History* (Shepherdstown, W.Va.: Patmos, 1975), 90–94.
- ²⁶Lubac, *Sources of Revelation*, 14–31; Jean Daniélou, *From Shadows to Reality: Studies in the Biblical Typology of the Fathers* (London: Burns & Oates, 1960).
- ²⁷The approach of Wilhelm Vischer (*The Witness of the Old Testament to Christ*, 3d ed., 2 vols. [London: Lutterworth, 1949], 28–29) comes very close to this position. See also Anthony Tyrrell Hanson, *Studies in Paul’s Technique and Theology* (London: SPCK, 1974), 226.
- ²⁸Moisés Silva, “New Testament Use of the Old Testament,” in *Scripture and Truth*, ed. Carson and Woodbridge (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1983), 163.
- ²⁹J. A. Sanders, “Habakkuk in Qumran, Paul, and the Old Testament,” *JR* 39 (1959): 235.
- ³⁰A. T. Hanson, *The New Testament Interpretation of the Old Testament* (London: SPCK, 1979), 13.
- ³¹See, for instance, J. I. Packer, “Infallible Scripture and the Role of Hermeneutics,” *Scripture and Truth*, ed. Carson and Woodbridge, 325–56.
- ³²Silva, “New Testament Use of the Old Testament,” 163–64.
- ³³S. Lewis Johnson, *The Old Testament in the New: An Argument for Biblical Inspiration* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1980), 66.
- ³⁴Bruce Vawter, *Biblical Inspiration* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1972), 16; see also Abraham, *Inspiration*, 105–7.
- ³⁵See, for instance, the discussion in Archibald A. Hodge and Benjamin B. Warfield, *Inspiration* (1881; reprint, Grand Rapids: Baker, 1979), 62–64.
- ³⁶For discussions of the function of quotations and allusions, see J. A. E. van Dodewaard, “La Force évocatrice de la citation,” *Bib* 36 (1955): 482–91; Rese,

Alttestamentliche Motive, 208–9; Suhl, *Funktion der alttestamentlichen Zitate*, 38–42; James Barr, *Old and New in Interpretation: A Study of the Two Testaments* (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), 115. Silva, "New Testament Use of the Old," 156–59, mentions similar considerations.

³⁷Douglas J. Moo, *The Old Testament in the Gospel Passion Narratives* (Sheffield: Almond, 1983), 240–42.

³⁸Silva, "New Testament Use of the Old," 157–58.

³⁹Eric D. Hirsch, Jr., *Validity in Interpretation* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), 121–26.

⁴⁰Longenecker, *Biblical Exegesis*, 126–27.

⁴¹Hans Conzelmann, *1 Corinthians* (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1975), 154–55.

⁴²Walter C. Kaiser, Jr., "The Current Crisis in Exegesis and the Apostolic Use of Deuteronomy 25:4 in 1 Corinthians 9:8–10," *JETS* 21:1 (March 1978): 3–18.

⁴³See Luke 4:23, Acts 18:21, 21:22, 28:4, and Archibald T. Robertson and Alfred Plummer, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the First Epistle of Paul to the Corinthians*, 2d ed. (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1914), 184.

⁴⁴Although some scholars claim that the addition genuinely reflects Old Testament teaching, such as is found in the "imprecatory psalms" (Gundry, *Matthew*, 96–97), this is almost certainly not the case. The most likely origin is the Qumran community, whose members were instructed to hate "the sons of darkness."

⁴⁵Silva, "New Testament Use of the Old," 159.

⁴⁶Achtemeier, *Inspiration*, 113; Vawter, *Inspiration*, 5.

⁴⁷Dewey Beegle, *Scripture, Tradition and Infallibility* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1973), 237.

⁴⁸See the studies of Stendahl (*School of St. Matthew*), Gundry (*Use of the Old Testament*), and Rothfuchs (*Erfüllungszitate*).

⁴⁹This is emphasized (perhaps too one-sidedly) by C. F. D. Moule, "Fulfillment-Words in the New Testament: Use and Abuse," *NTS* 14 (1967–68): 293–320. See also Bruce M. Metzger, "The Formulas Introducing Quotations of Scripture in the NT and the Mishnah," *JBL* 70 (1951): 297–307; Rothfuchs, *Erfüllungszitate*, 48–49; George M. Soares Prabhu, *The Formula Quotations in the Infancy Narrative of Matthew: An Enquiry into the Tradition History of Mt. 1–2* (Rome: Biblical Institute, 1976), 46–47; Gottlob Schrenk, *TDNT*, 1:758–59.

⁵⁰For this interpretation of these key Matthean texts, see especially Robert Banks, *Jesus and the Law in the Synoptic Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), esp. 207–12; John P. Meier, *Law and History in Matthew's Gospel: A Redactional Study of Mt. 5:17–48* (Rome: Biblical Institute, 1976), esp. 66–75.

⁵¹D. A. Carson, "Matthew," *EBC*, 8:92–93.

⁵²Beegle, *Scripture*, 237–38.

⁵³Longenecker, *Biblical Exegesis*, 70–73, 211–13.

⁵⁴The bibliography on "pesher" and "midrash" in Jewish literature and the New Testament is enormous. Useful surveys and discussions can be found in Longenecker, *Biblical Exegesis*, 32–45; Merrill P. Miller, "Targum, Midrash and the Use of the Old Testament in the New Testament," *Journal for the Study of Judaism in the Persian, Hellenistic and Roman Periods* 2 (1971): 29–82; E. Earle Ellis, "Midrash, Targum and New Testament Quotations," *Neotestamentica et Semitica: Studies in Honour of Matthew Black*, ed. E. Earle Ellis and Max Wilcox (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1969); idem, "How the New Testament Uses the Old," *New Testament Interpretation; Essays on Principles and Methods*, ed. I. Howard Marshall (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1977); Joseph A. Fitzmyer, "The Use of Explicit Old Testament Quotations in Qumran Literature and in the New Testament," *NTS* 7 (1960–61): 297–333; Roger Le Déaut, "Apropos d'une définition du Midrash," *Bib* 50 (1969): 395–413 [ET in *Int* 25 (1971): 259–82]; F. F. Bruce,

Biblical Exegesis in the Qumran Texts (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1960); R. Bloch, "Midrasch," *DBSup*, 5:1263-81; Otto Betz, *Offenbarung und Schriftforschung in der Qumransekte* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1960); Joseph Bonsirven, *Exégèse rabbinique et Exégèse paulinienne* (Paris: Beauchesne and Sons, 1939); *Gospel Perspectives*, Vol. 3, *Studies in Midrash and History*, ed. France and Wenham. I attempt to describe and categorize some of these methods in my book, *Old Testament in the Gospel Passion Narratives*, 5-78.

⁵⁵See Moo, *Old Testament*, 388-92.

⁵⁶*Ibid.*, 75-78.

⁵⁷"Midrash Peshet in Pauline Hermeneutics," *Prophecy and Hermeneutic in Early Christianity* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1978), 180 [= *NTS* 2 (1955-56): 127-33]. See, for a similar approach, Longenecker, *Biblical Exegesis*, 212.

⁵⁸See, above all, Goppelt, *Typos* ("Die Typologie ist die im Schriftgebrauch des NT vorherrschende und für ihn charakteristische Deutungsweise . . ." [p. 239]). See also Fairbairn (*Typology*), Nicole ("Patrick Fairbairn and Biblical Hermeneutics"), and S. Lewis Johnson ("A Response to Patrick Fairbairn and Biblical Hermeneutics as Related to the Quotations of the Old Testament in the New," *Hermeneutics, Inerrancy, and the Bible*, ed. Radmacher and Preus, 794).

⁵⁹David Baker, "Typology and the Christian Use of the Old Testament," *SJT* 29 (1976): 153.

⁶⁰In the modern resurgence of interest in typology, it is often claimed that a historical basis for the type is unnecessary; all that is required is a "salvation-historical" basis (for instance, Gerhard von Rad, "Typological Interpretation of the Old Testament," *Essays on Old Testament Interpretation*, ed. Claus Westermann [London: SCM, 1963], 20-38). However, Davidson argues convincingly that the New Testament use of typology depends for its validity on the historical reality of the type (*Typology in Scripture*, 398).

⁶¹"Typology means not that there is a relation between things visible and invisible, but that there is a correspondence between historical realities at different stages of redemptive history" (Jean Daniélou, "The Fathers and the Scriptures," *Theology* 57 [1954]: 85). As Oscar Cullmann correctly notes, then, typology is inextricably bound up with a salvation-historical scheme, while allegory is not (*Salvation in History* [London: SCM, 1967], 132-33). See also Francis Foulkes, *The Acts of God: A Study of the Basis of Typology in the Old Testament* (London: Tyndale, 1958), 35.

⁶²"Bei aller typologischen Wiederholung steht das Kommende im Gegensatz zum Alten. Es ist nicht eine reichere, vollkommene Form des Alten, auch keine neue Entwicklungsstufe . . . sondern die eschatologische Erfüllung. Es besteht also weder das Verhältnis der Repetition noch das Komparitius, sondern das der einzigartigen endzeitlichen Vollendung" (Kurt Frör, *Biblische Hermeneutik. Zur Schriftauslegung in Predigt und Unterricht*, 3d ed. [Munich: Kaiser, 1967], 86-87). See also Fairbairn, *Typology*, 1:150; Goppelt, *Typos*, 18-19.

⁶³Davidson (*Typology in Scripture*, 94) points out that typology has traditionally been viewed as having a predictive function, while many modern advocates of the method see it as entirely retrospective. Thus Fairbairn (*Typology*, 1:46) makes a requirement for genuine typology that the type be designed and ordained by God (see also Goppelt, *Typos*, 18-19; Johnson, *Old Testament in the New*, 56). On the other hand, Baker ("Typology," 149), Foulkes (*Acts of God*, 20-34), and France (*Jesus and the Old Testament*, 39-40), among others, carefully distinguish typology from exegesis and claim that types need have no intrinsic prospective function.

⁶⁴Goppelt, *Typos*, 244.

⁶⁵Cullmann's *Salvation in History* is one of the more important statements of the position, but it is a widely recognized scheme (see also Hermann Ridderbos, *Paul: An Outline of His Theology* [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1975], 44-90).

⁶⁶See especially the careful exegesis of Davidson, *Typology in Scripture*, 193-297.

⁶⁷Albert Vis, *The Messianic Psalm Quotations in the New Testament. A Critical Study on the Christian 'Testimonies' in the Old Testament* (Amsterdam: von Soest, 1936), 38–40.

⁶⁸See Bruce Waltke, "A Canonical Approach to the Psalms," *Tradition and Testament: Essays in Honor of Charles Lee Feinberg*, ed. John S. Feinberg and Paul D. Feinberg (Chicago: Moody, 1981), 11–14. This larger theological setting and significance is too often ignored in modern scholarship. The strictures of George Dahl are worth quoting in full: "There seems to be abroad a strangely perverted and sadistically exaggerated sense of honesty in estimating our sacred writings, according to which one ought always to choose the less worthy and less religious of two possible interpretations of any given passage. Whenever in the Psalms the word 'Messiah' appears, every nerve is strained, and every device of forced exegesis utilized, in order to make it refer merely to the secular king and his mundane affairs. Even where the whole context is saturated with the characteristic motifs of Israel's dynamic and intensely religious Messianic expectation, one must never admit that the Messiah is meant" ("The Messianic Expectation in the Psalter," *JBL* 57 [1938]: 2).

⁶⁹L. Ruppert, *Jesus als der leidende Gerechte? Der Weg Jesu im Lichte eines alt- und zwischentestamentlichen Motivs* (Stuttgart: Katholisches Bibelwerk, 1972); Eduard Schweizer, *Erniedrigung und Erhöhung bei Jesus und seinen Nachfolgern* (Zürich: Zwingli, 1962), 22–24. On the background of the concept, see Hans-Werner Surkau, *Martyrien in jüdischer und frühchristlicher Zeit* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1938), 7–29.

⁷⁰P. Grelot, *Sens Chrétien de l'Ancien Testament*, [Bibliothèque de Théologie, 1: Théologie Dogmatique, 3], 2d ed. (Paris: Desclée, 1962), 463–64; Donald A. Hagner, "The Old Testament in the New Testament," *Interpreting the Word of God* [Festschrift in Honor of Steven Barnabas], ed. Samuel J. Schultz and Morris A. Inch (Chicago: Moody, 1976), 94–102.

⁷¹Goppelt, *Typos*, 124; Moo, *Old Testament*, 289–300. For the Davidic connection, see John R. Donahue, "Temple, Trial and Royal Christology (Mk. 14:53–65)" *The Passion in Mark: Studies in Mark 14–16*, ed. Werner H. Kelber (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1976), 75–77.

⁷²On this point, see the arguments of Fairbairn, *Typology*, 1:21.

⁷³Most of the relevant articles have now been gathered into a book, with some revisions and additions: Walter C. Kaiser, Jr., *The Uses of the Old Testament in the New Testament* (Chicago: Moody, 1985).

⁷⁴Walter C. Kaiser, Jr., "Legitimate Hermeneutics," *Inerrancy*, ed. Geisler, 135.

⁷⁵Here Kaiser leans heavily on Hirsch, *Validity in Interpretation*.

⁷⁶Kaiser has been strongly influenced by Willis J. Beecher, *The Prophets and the Promise* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1905; reprint, Grand Rapids: Baker, 1963).

⁷⁷See the criticism of Philip B. Payne, "The Fallacy of Equating Meaning with the Human Author's Intention," *JETS* 20 (1977): 243–52. The "intentional fallacy" describes the notion that one can appeal behind the text to the intention of the author. But Kaiser clearly insists that intention be tied to the evidence of the text. See, further, John W. Montgomery, "Biblical Inerrancy: What Is at Stake?" *God's Inerrant Word* (Minneapolis: Bethany, 1973), 31.

⁷⁸*Uses of the Old Testament*, 47–53.

⁷⁹Raymond E. Brown, *The 'Sensus Plenior' of Sacred Scripture* (Baltimore: St. Mary's University, 1955), 92. See also Brown's later article "The 'Sensus Plenior' in the Last Ten Years," *CBQ* 25 (1963): 262–85; Grelot, *Sens Chrétien*, 458–97; Pierre Benoit, "La plénitude de Sens de Livres Saints," *RB* 67 (1960): 161–96; Edward F. Sutcliffe, "The Plenary Sense as a Principle of Interpretation," *Bib* 34 (1953): 333–43; and the survey in Henning Graf Reventlow, *Hauptprobleme der Biblischen Theologie im 20. Jahrhundert* (Erträge der Forschung 203; Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1983), 39–49. The phrase *sensus plenior* was apparently first used in this sense by Andrea Fernández in 1927 (Brown, *Sensus Plenior*, 88).

⁸⁰Brown, *Sensus Plenior*, 113. Grelot (*Sens Chrétien*, 453–55) argues that the author of a given text would not have been aware of the *sensus plenior* in a "notional" way but may have been conscious of a fuller meaning in some other sense.

⁸¹Brown, "Sensus Plenior," 277; Benoit, "La Plénitude," 189.

⁸²Brown, *Sensus Plenior*, 92. As we have seen, a distinction of this sort can be traced back at least as far as Aquinas.

⁸³*Sensus Plenior*, 70.

⁸⁴Although Benoit ("La Plénitude," 184–86) wants to confine the *sensus plenior* to relationships between the Testaments.

⁸⁵John W. Wenham succinctly states a kind of *sensus plenior* approach: "The Holy Spirit knew beforehand the course of history with its consummation in Christ, and so in guiding the writers he intended a deeper meaning than they understood" (*Christ and the Bible*, 2d ed. [Grand Rapids: Baker, 1984], 103). Cf. also Hagner, "Old Testament in the New Testament," 91–92.

⁸⁶John L. McKenzie, "Problems of Hermeneutics in Roman Catholic Exegesis," *JBL* 77 (1958): 202.

⁸⁷Cf. Hagner, "Old Testament in the New," 103 (though he overstates the case).

⁸⁸The text often cited with respect to this question is 1 Peter 1:10–12: "The prophets who prophesied of the grace that was to be yours searched and inquired . . . what person or time [*tina ē poion kairon*] was indicated by the Spirit of Christ within them when predicting the sufferings of Christ and the subsequent glory. It was revealed to them that they were serving not themselves but you, in the things which have now been announced to you by those who preached the good news to you through the Holy Spirit sent from heaven, things into which angels long to look" (RSV). Kaiser has argued that both indefinite pronouns in verse 10 refer to *kairon*, so that Peter is not saying that the prophets were uncertain about the person (see, e.g., "The Current Crisis in Exegesis," 8n). But the grammar is not clear and, in any case, the text does not say that the prophets knew all that the New Testament claims to find in their prophecies.

⁸⁹Vawter, *Inspiration*, 115–16; Kaiser, "Current Crisis," 8–9; Rudolf Bierberg, "Does Sacred Scripture Have a 'Sensus Plenior'?" *CBQ* 10 (1948): 195; John J. O'Rourke, "Marginal Notes on the 'Sensus Plenior,'" *CBQ* 21 (1959): 65–66.

⁹⁰Brown, *Sensus Plenior*, 133.

⁹¹Walter C. Kaiser, Jr., "Author's Intention: Response," *Hermeneutics, Inerrancy, and the Bible*, ed. Radmacher and Preus, 444.

⁹²Brown, "Sensus Plenior," 277.

⁹³Packer, "Infallible Scripture and the Role of Hermeneutics," 350.

⁹⁴See, however, Kaiser's attempt to demonstrate the messianic focus of the psalm ("The Promise to David in Psalm 16 and Its Application in Acts 2:25–33 and 13:32–37," *JETS* 23 (1980): 219–30). While Kaiser succeeds in showing that the psalm does have a legitimate messianic application, he has not shown that the specific application made by Peter (Jesus' resurrection) can be established exegetically in the psalm (see the criticisms of Elliot Johnson, "Author's Intention and Biblical Interpretation," *Hermeneutics, Inerrancy, and the Bible*, ed. Radmacher and Preus, 417–25).

⁹⁵Norbert Lohfink, "The Inerrancy of Scripture," *The Christian Meaning of the Old Testament* (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1968), 42–43.

⁹⁶William Sanford LaSor, "Prophecy, Inspiration, and *Sensus Plenior*," *TB* 29 (1978): 54–56; idem, "The 'Sensus Plenior' and Biblical Interpretation," *Scripture, Tradition and Interpretation*, ed. W. Ward Gasque and William Sanford LaSor (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1978), 273–75; Waltke, "Canonical Approach to the Psalms," 5–13; Carson, "Matthew," 92–93; Packer, "Role of Hermeneutics," 350; cf. Bruce, *Biblical Exegesis*, 77.

⁹⁷This phenomenon has been particularly emphasized in the salvation-historical approach of von Rad (see his *Old Testament Theology*, 2 vols. [Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1965] and also Walter Zimmerli, "Promise and Fulfillment," *Essays on Old Testament Interpretation*, 112).

⁹⁸See, for example, Carson, "Matthew," 94–95.

⁹⁹See the discussion of this question in Longenecker (*Biblical Exegesis*, 214–20), Silva ("New Testament Use of the Old," 162–64), and Johnson (*Old Testament in the New*, 78–83, 93–94).

¹⁰⁰J. Lambrecht, "Paul's Christological Use of Scripture in 1 Cor. 15:20–28," *NTS* 28 (1982): 510.

¹⁰¹Charles Hodge, *An Exposition of the First Epistle to the Corinthians* (Robert Carter & Brothers, 1857; reprint, Grand Rapids: Baker, 1980), 332; Sutcliffe, "The Plenary Sense," 333–34.

¹⁰²Joachim Jeremias, *TDNT*, 1:143; Oscar Cullmann, *The Christology of the New Testament* (London: SCM, 1959), 188; P. Giles, "The Son of Man in the Epistle to the Hebrews," *ExpT* 86 (1975): 330–31; George Wesley Buchanan, *The Epistle to the Hebrews* (New York: Doubleday, 1972), 38–51. Francis J. Moloney has argued that the targum on the psalm may preserve an early semimessianic interpretation that could have prepared for Paul's use ("The Reinterpretation of Psalm VIII and the Son of Man Debate," *NTS* 27 [1980–81]: 656–72).

¹⁰³See particularly the discussion in Ridderbos, *Paul*, 85.

¹⁰⁴"As ever, the coming of Christ revealed a whole landscape on the horizon to which the Old Testament was pointing": Derek Kidner, *Psalms 1–72: An Introduction and Commentary on Books I and II of the Psalms* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1973), 68. Cf. also Dodd, *According to the Scriptures*, 117–18, 131; F. F. Bruce, *The Epistle to the Hebrews* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1964), 36; Philip Edgcumbe Hughes, *A Commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1977), 83–87; Robertson and Plummer, *First Corinthians*, 357.

¹⁰⁵Yet J. Gerald Janzen has argued that the antecedent is "vision" and that Habakkuk is stressing the reliability of that vision ("Habakkuk 2:2–4 in the Light of Recent Philological Advances," *HTR* 73 [1980]: 53–78).

¹⁰⁶Manuscript A of the LXX has *ho de dikaios mou ek pisteōs zēsetai*, but this word order may have been influenced by Hebrews 10:38. Other Greek versions use the third person qualifier (8 Hev XII gr, col. 12; Aquila) or the even more clear reflexive (Symmachus). On the textual situation, see Joseph A. Fitzmyer, "Habakkuk 2:3–4 and the New Testament," *To Advance the Gospel* (New York: Crossroad, 1981), 240–42; Lindars, *New Testament Apologetic*, 231.

¹⁰⁷See the exchange between Torrance and Moule in *ExpT* 68 (1956–57): 111–14, 157, 221–22; D. W. B. Robinson, "Faith of Jesus Christ"—A New Testament Debate," *RTR* 29 (1970): 71–81. Arland Hultgren ("The ΠΙΣΤΙΣ ΧΡΙΣΤΟΥ Formulation in Paul," *NovT* 22 [1980]: 248–63) provides a valuable survey, arguing for a blending of objective and subjective genitives in the phrase. Richard B. Hays has recently argued that the phrase in Galatians 3:11 is purposely ambiguous, denoting both the faith of the Messiah and the faith of the righteous person (*The Faith of Jesus Christ: An Investigation of the Narrative Substructure of Galatians 3:1–4:11* [Chico, Calif.: Scholars, 1983], 150–56). Much depends on one's overall reading of Galatians 3, but I think Longenecker (who argues for "faithfulness of Christ" as the rendering in other occurrences of the formula) is right: the context demands that *pistis* means "human trust and reliance" (*Paul: Apostle of Liberty* [New York: Doubleday, 1964], 150).

¹⁰⁸Lindars, *New Testament Apologetic*, 231.

¹⁰⁹For arguments in favor of this reading, see especially J. B. Lightfoot, *Notes on Epistles of St. Paul*, ed. J. R. Harmer (London: Macmillan, 1895; reprint, Grand Rapids: Baker, 1980), 250–51; H. C. C. Cavallin, "The Righteous Shall Live by Faith: A Decisive Argument for the Traditional Interpretation," *Studia Theologica* 32 (1978): 33–43.

¹¹⁰See, especially, A. Feuillet, "La citation d'Habacuc II.4 et les Huit premiers chapître de L'Épître aux Romains," *NTS* 6 (1958–59): 52–80; C. E. B. Cranfield, *A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans*, 2 vols. (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1975, 1979), 1:101–2.

¹¹¹Thus, Ernst Käsemann concludes that Paul's interpretation "neither does justice to the OT text nor finds any support in Jewish exegesis" (*Commentary on Romans* [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1980], 32).

¹¹²See especially the still valuable treatment by Herman Cremer, *Die paulinische Rechtfertigungslehre im Zusammenhange ihrer geschichtlichen Voraussetzungen*, 2d ed. (Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 1900), esp. 348–49.

¹¹³This usage is rooted especially in the Deuteronomic tradition.

¹¹⁴Cremer, *Rechtfertigungslehre*, 60–65.

¹¹⁵Habakkuk 2:4 is quoted in IQpHab 7:17 and is applied to "all the doers of the law in the house of Judah" who will be delivered out of the house of judgment because of their sufferings and their faith in the teacher of righteousness (8:1–3a). Clearly, "faith in the teacher of righteousness," linked as it is to the doing of the law, carries a far different meaning than Paul's "faith in Jesus Christ." The rabbis set forth Habakkuk 2:4 as a key summary of the demand of God, but it was related to keeping the law and monotheism (cf. b. Makk. 23b; Cranfield, *Romans*, 1:101).

¹¹⁶"Die alttestamentliche und jüdische Denkform wird durch das Evangelium gesprengt" (Otto Michel, *Der Brief an die Römer*, 5th ed. [MeyerK: Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1978], 90). Cf. also Ridderbos, *Paul*, 172; Cremer, *Rechtfertigungslehre*, 348–49. A. Strobel ties Paul's use of this verse to a Jewish eschatological scheme based on Habakkuk 2:3 (*Untersuchungen zum eschatologischen Verzögerungsproblem auf Grund der spätjüdisch-urchristlichen Geschichte von Habakuk 2,2 ff* [Leiden: Brill, 1961], 173–202), while Ellis suggests that Habakkuk 2:4 may function as part of a midrashic structure with Genesis 15:6 as its basis ("Midrash Peshar," 174–77). Neither suggestion has enough evidence to make it convincing.

¹¹⁷"Sensus Plenior," 279.

¹¹⁸For some examples, see the passages treated in my book *Use of the Old Testament in the Gospel Passion Narratives*.

CHAPTER SIX

THE SPIRIT AND THE SCRIPTURES

John M. Frame

213–35

¹On the general subject of the Spirit's witness to Scripture, I should mention some valuable works (not elsewhere directly cited in the notes) that I have found helpful. One is Bernard Ramm, *The Witness of the Spirit* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1957); then, two by Arthur Pink: *The Holy Spirit* (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1970) and *The Doctrine of Revelation* (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1975). Although he is probably to be classed as a popular rather than a scholarly writer, Pink's works are often remarkably thorough and insightful.

²Some of the most useful works today are these: Wayne A. Grudem, "Scripture's Self-Attestation and the Problem of Formulating a Doctrine of Scripture," in *Scripture and Truth*, ed. D. A. Carson and John W. Woodbridge (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1983), 19–59; Meredith G. Kline, *The Structure of Biblical Authority* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1975); John Murray, "The Attestation of Scripture," in *The Infallible Word*, ed. Ned Stonehouse and Paul Woolley (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1946); Cornelius Van Til, *A Christian Theory of Knowledge* (Nutley, N.J.: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1969); Benjamin B. Warfield, *The Inspiration and Authority of the Bible* (Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1948); Edward J. Young, *Thy Word is Truth* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1957).